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The dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay examines the information 
contents of after-hours earnings announcements. The study investigates the after-hours 
trading (AHT) activities, price contribution and price discovery following the quarterly 
earnings announcements released outside of the normal trading hours. We hypothesize 
that trading activity and price discovery on the announcement days are higher than non-
announcement days during the same AHT periods. Similarly, the price discovery on 
earnings announcement days is expected to be higher than that of the non-announcements 
days during the same AHT periods. For a sample of S&P500 stocks from 2004-2008, we 
find that despite lower volume, trading activities after hours are heightened on days with 
earnings announcements. A significant portion of price change and price discovery 
occurs immediately after the earnings releases during the before market open or after 
market close sessions. Prices in AHT show relatively large degree of informational 
efficiency, further demonstrating the importance of the price discovery in AHT as these 
prices are not likely to be all driven by noise trading. 
The second essay is related to the impact of low cost carriers (LCCs) 
announcement on the legacy airlines. The successful emergence of low cost carriers 
(LCCs) is an important structural and financial development in the airline industry. 
Oligopoly structure, entry barriers, and high fixed costs make the industry highly 
susceptible to competitive and network expansion impacts of LCC entry. We hypothesize 
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that LCC entry not only increases competition in the industry but also expands the 
number of airline travellers. As a result, the level of competition should have a negative 
effect on the returns of legacy airlines while network expansion should have a positive 
effect. We conduct event studies and regression analysis to explore the impacts of LCC 
entry on legacy airline stock prices. As a surprising result, positive stock returns are 
observed, which we interpret as the spillover effects of network expansion. Thus, 
economies of scope from increased passengers and connectivity increase the revenues of 









 My dissertation consists of two essays and both involve primarily corporate 
events. I think it is a good idea to discuss briefly of the origin of my essays. The first 
essay is about the information contents from corporate earnings announcements. Why are 
most firms making earnings announcements when market is closed? I was fortunate 
enough to meet Dr. Christine Jiang one day and she suggested to me that I explore this 
topic. The topic of after-hours earnings announcements has only been pursued by a 
limited number of research papers, and it is the aim of this paper to fill the academic gap. 
Therefore, I believe this research idea will be interesting and worth exploring since 
trading in stock markets is progressing towards a 24-hour market. The details of the 
analysis are presented in essay 1. It has been submitted to The Journal of Accounting 
Research. 
 My second essay examines the effect of low cost airlines company 
announcements and new market entry on the more established legacy airlines. The 
motivation for this paper was generated during a finance seminar with Dr. Pankaj Jain. 
He introduced me to Dr. Rose Rubin who was researching low cost airlines. I had heard 
of the term low cost airline before but did not know more than the fact that its ticket price 
is cheaper than the traditional ones. I found that the interactions between players in the 
industry were not only from the competition but also from network expansion. Detailed 
analysis of the effects of low cost airlines on the legacy airlines and network expansion 
effects and stock returns of the legacy airlines are presented in essay 2. This paper has 
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 Corporate events play significant roles in financial markets. There are various 
kinds of announcements including earnings announcements of public companies, 
announcements of newly launched products or markets entry, and so on. Information 
from an announcement of a corporation could have multiple impacts on several market 
participants, such as investors, competitors, and regulators. Investors use information 
derived from earnings announcements to help make investment decisions while 
competitors can use this information to learn about their position in the market and to 
devise competing strategies. Regulators make use of the information to keep pace with 
changes in the market to protect investors. We examine the impact of corporate event 
announcement from two different perspectives. The first chapter is a study of the 
information contents from the after-hours earnings announcements. The second chapter 
examines impacts of low cost carriers’ (LCCs) entry announcements on the legacy 
airlines. 
 In chapter 1, we study the information contents following corporate earnings 
announcements that are made during market close. Firms have increasingly made their 
quarterly earnings announcements outside the regular market hours. Normally, trading 
volumes of the aftermarket are very low compared to trading volume during the normal 
market hours. Previous research finds that the after-hours periods have lower liquidity, 
thin trading volume, higher trading cost and higher price volatility. While all types of 
investors, regardless of large or small, and institutional or retail, can now trade in either 
regular or after-hours trading sessions. However, stock trading activities still concentrate 
in the regular trading hours. We aim to fill the gap in previous literatures on market 
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responses in the regular trading hours to earnings announcements made during trading 
and non-trading hours. We hypothesize that the trading activities during the after-hours 
periods are heightened on the earnings announcement days compared to the non-
announcement days. We also hypothesize that the significant amount of price 
contribution and price discovery immediately occur after the announcements. 
 In chapter 2, we examine the impact of announcements and actual entry of LCCs 
on the legacy airlines in term of competition, network expansion and stock valuation. 
LCCs have successfully emerged since 1978 and now represent one third of the market. 
An entry of LCC is typically perceived as a competitor to the legacy airlines. Many 
papers have investigated the impact of LCCs’ entry on the legacy airlines such as airfare 
reduction and losses in market share. However, no study has been done on network 
expansion benefits of low cost airlines for the legacy airlines. In this chapter, we 
investigate the stock price reaction of the legacy airlines when an LCC make an 
announcement to enter a new market. We hypothesize two opposing effects of LCC 
entry. First LCC entry increases the level of competition in the overall airline industry 
and has negative effect on stock return of legacy airlines. Second, the LCC entry creates 
the network expansion benefit to the legacy airline and has positive effect on stock return 










Information Content of Earnings Announcements: 
Evidence from After Hours Trading 
1. Introduction 
After-hours trading (AHT) refers to the buying and selling of securities listed on 
major exchanges outside of specified regular trading hours (RTH), which in the U.S. are 
9:30-16:00. Currently, all types of investors both large and small, and institutional and 
retail, can trade in one of the two AHT sessions—before market open. However, the 
belief of proponents of after-hours trading that it would lead to 24-hour trading similar to 
that in the Forex market has not been realized.1 In fact, AHT on the NYSE and NASDAQ 
accounts for only 3 percent of daily trading volume.2
Obviously, understanding AHT on event days, particularly on corporate earnings 
announcement days, is important for investors and regulators. Several papers study 
liquidity and price discovery during AHT. Barclay and Hendershott [2003, 2004] report 
 However, volume in after hours 
trading tends to be event driven. Overnight news or world market sell-offs drive the early 
session, and earnings reports drive the after-markets [Mehta, 2009]. After the London 
subway attack in July 2005, 120 million shares traded in Arca's pre-open session. 
Similarly, when Google posted a profit that missed Wall Street targets on January 31, 
2006 for the first time, its shares went down as much as 19 percent ($70) in AHT, a $15 
billion drop in market. 
                                                          
1 Matt Krantz, USA Today, May 3, 2007, Investors spurn after-hours trading. 




lower liquidity and thin trading volume in both before market open (BMO) and after 
market close (AMC) sessions. Moreover, trades in the AMC session make smaller 
contribution to price discovery than do trades during the BMO. Though they do not study 
earnings announcements, these authors conjecture that earnings announcements made 
after the close are likely to be associated with higher volatility and price reversals. We 
directly test these conjectures.  
This topic is timely because firms have increasingly been reporting earnings 
outside of RTH. Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts [2006] report that only 27% of quarterly 
earnings announcements occur during RTH. We believe that we are the first to study 
AHT in reaction to earnings announcements made after-hours. Our study differs from 
previous studies on trading over a 24-hour period (including after hours, without 
conditioning on any events) such as Barclay and Hendershott [2003, 2004], and studies 
on market responses during RTH to announcements made during trading and non-trading 
hours (Greene and Watts [1996]). In contrast, our primary focus is to examine the 
immediate reaction of liquidity and price discovery in the AHT session upon the release 
of earnings news made after hours. Having the ability to trade in AHT allows investors to 
react quickly to breaking news stories or fresh information. This flexibility in trading is 
even more valuable when huge price swings and heavy trading are observed when a firm 
either beats the street’s estimates or disappoints.  
We collect every earnings announcement for every firm in the S&P 500 for 2004-
2008. More than 95% of the announcements are made outside RTH. We address five 
aspects of trading following after-hours earnings announcements. First, we present fresh 
evidence concerning the AHT volume, number of trades, and trade size. Our results show 
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that trading increases markedly following announcements. Therefore, we must look 
beyond the very low volume that typifies AHT trading and, instead, look at event days. 
Second, we examine the liquidity as measured by the quoted and effective spread. Similar 
to Barclay and Hendershott [2004], spreads are typically higher during AHT when 
compared with spreads during regular trading. However, following earnings 
announcements spreads in AHT are often significantly lower than those on non-
announcement days. Third, we study how much of the daily price changes occur in the 
AHT rather than during RTH. Following Barclay and Warner [1993], we calculate the 
weighted price changes to measure price contribution from each trading period. We find 
that the contributions of the BMO and AMC periods are about 36% and 60% of the price 
changes, respectively. As the length of the times periods differs across BMO and AMC, 
we further examine the price contribution per trade. We find that price change per trade is 
higher in the BMO than in the AMC, consistent with Barclay and Hendershott [2003]. 
We use regression analysis to explore several characteristics of the stocks that may affect 
price changes. We find that stocks with higher intraday volume and AMC 
announcements have higher weighted price changes, while price changes are lower for 
large cap stock and stocks listed on NYSE. 
Fourth, we investigate the magnitude of public and private information in the 
AHT session. We use Hasbrouck’s [1991] variance decomposition model to calculate 
price discovery or trade informativeness. We hypothesize that price discovery on 
earnings announcement days is higher than that of the non-announcements days during 
the same AHT periods. We find a significant portion of price discovery during both BMO 
and AMC sessions on announcement days, 30% and 37% for BMO and AMC 
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announcements, respectively. Also, we use OLS to explore factors that potentially affect 
the magnitude of price discovery in AHT. We consider a set of explanatory variables that 
have been used in the previous literature to explain the magnitude of the price discovery. 
We find that the magnitude of price discovery is positively correlated with trading 
volume and AMC announcements. Price discovery is lower for large stocks, stocks with 
higher trading cost, and stocks listed on the NYSE. We find that earnings surprises and 
analysts followings do not play an important role in price discovery during AHT.  
Fifth, we examine the efficiency of AHT prices, using the methodology of Biais, 
Hillion, and Spatt [1999]. An efficient price indicates the convergence of prices toward 
equilibrium market valuation. We find that prices in after-hours trading show a relatively 
large degree of informational efficiency, which further demonstrates the importance of 
price discovery in AHT as these prices are not likely to be all driven by noise trading. 
 Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. The findings may be useful 
for traders, market makers in making decisions on AHT as we shed light on liquidity and 
price discovery process. Regulators may find our results of interests in deciding whether 
investors need greater protection during AHT. The regulatory structure, particularly in 
the areas of investor protection and market integrity, needs to be current and forceful. Our 
study also contributes to a broad and extensive literature on the post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD) (Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin [1984]) as we examine the 
immediate reaction to earnings releases. A recent paper by Berkman and Truong [2009] 
highlights the importance of accounting for after-hours announcements for event studies 
around earnings announcements. Future studies of market reaction on earnings 
17 
 
announcements need to incorporate trading and price discovery in the AHT, a period 
often ignored in prior literature on PEAD.  
2. Literature Review 
Barclay and Hendershott [2003] examine the price discovery and trading of 
NASDAQ securities for the BMO, AMC and RTH. They find that during the BMO and 
AMC, trading volume is very thin while trading costs and information asymmetry are 
very high, and that there is a higher frequency of informed trading and more price 
discovery per trade for the BMO compared to the AMC. In Barclay and Hendershott 
[2004], the cost of trading measured by effective and realized spreads is larger during 
BMO and AMC than during RTH. McInish, Van Ness and Van Ness [2002] study the 
AHT of NYSE-listed stocks on regional exchanges. They find that most active stocks 
during RTH tend to continue trading actively in AHT. Trading costs are greater in AHT 
than during regular hours, trading volumes and depths are also lower in AHT. Cao, 
Ghysels and Hathaway [2000] study preopening quotes as signaling for price discovery 
on the NASDAQ. They find price contribution per unit time of the locked and crossed 
periods is larger during the regular trading period.  
However, we know of no study of AHT following earnings announcements made 
outside of RTH. Previous studies focus on AHT in reaction to news during RTH or RTH 
trading subsequent to announcements made after hours. Our research design allows us to 
study the immediate market reactions in AHT, which has become increasingly active in 
recent years. Francis, Pagach and Stephan [1992] investigate the market responses to 
overnight and daytime announcements of U.S. firms. They focus on volume and price 
18 
 
reaction at the open following overnight announcements. Greene and Watts [1996] 
examine price discovery that occurs during RTH following earnings announcements 
made both during and outside RTH. Using average transaction returns for 15-minute 
intervals, they find that the majority of price responses in AHT occur within the first 15 
minutes of the next day’s trading. However, NASDAQ stocks show a faster price 
response to earnings announcements during RTH while price adjustment of NYSE stocks 
is spread over several transactions. Berkman and Truong [2009] point out that event 
studies of earnings announcements typically assign the Compustat or I/B/E/S earnings 
announcement date as event day 0, which is incorrect when announcements are made 
after hours. To accurately measure price changes and abnormal volume in reaction to the 
after-hours earnings announcements, the event day needs to be adjusted to account for 
abnormal return and volume occurring in the after-hours periods. 
3. Background, Data and Sample Formation  
In 1986, Instinet launched the crossing system that matched after-hours orders at 
the market-closing price. AHT has been limited to high net worth investors and 
institutional investors until 1999. AHT now is accessible to both institutional and retail 
investors via ECNs.  
We obtain intraday trades and quotes for the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 
TAQ for all firms included in the S&P500 from 2004 to 2008. Following Huang and Stoll 
[1996], we exclude: trade prices, bid prices, ask prices, trade sizes and quote sizes that 
are not positive; ask price <= the bid price; locked and crossed quotes; trades that are out 
of sequence, involve error corrections, or nonstandard settlement (TAQ condition codes 
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P,W,Z, and G); quotes that are associated with trading halts, order imbalances, or non-
firm quotes are excluded (TAQ condition codes 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, and 
27);3 quotes with spreads larger than $5; trade-to-trade and quote-to-quote price change 
of more than 30%;4
Among the few studies on AHT, different cutoff times are used to identify the 
AHT sessions: McInish, Van Ness and Van Ness [2002], 9:30-16:00 and 16:00-16:30; 
Pronk [2006] 9:30–16:00 and 16:00–9:30; Barclay and Hendershott [2003], 8:00–9:30, 
16:00–18:30 and 18:30-8:00; Bagnoli, Clement and Watts [2006], 5:00–9:30, 16:00–
 Our final sample comprises 582 stocks with 10,238 quarterly 
earnings announcements. 479 of our sample stocks are NYSE-listed and 103 are 
NASDAQ-listed. We collect daily prices, volumes, market capitalizations, and shares 
outstanding from the CRSP. We obtain the S&P500 constituents from Compustat Index 
Constituents.  
Our primary source of quarterly earnings announcements is I/B/E/S, which 
provides both the date and time of earnings releases. We cross check these using data 
from Compustat and Bloomberg. Compustat reports the firms’ earnings release dates, but 
no release time while Bloomberg only provides the exact time of earnings releases for 
about 50% of our announcements. We drop announcements made during RTH. 
                                                          
3 We search TAQ database for trading halts related to earnings announcements; specifically, 
condition code 4 for news dissemination, and 11 for news pending. There are very few halts related to 
after-hours earnings announcements. Our sample has a total of 90 halts with condition code 4. No halts 
with code 11 are found. In addition, halts with condition 7 (order imbalance), which is used in Jiang, 
McInish, Upson (2009) are also not found. We match the earnings announcement time with the halt time. 
We find that there are 7 halts during the afternoon periods while the earnings announcements are made in 
the BMO. The rest are halts in the afternoons associated with the AMC announcements. Out of the 83 
AMC halts, 77 halts are issued before the earnings releases and only 6 halts occurred following the 
earnings releases. On average, we find that trading halts occur 16.42 minutes before earnings 
announcements and trades resume within 4.30 minutes after the halt. 
4 In their study, Huang and Stoll use 10% to filter data errors during regular trading hours. 
According to the SEC’s special study, trades in the AHT periods tend to have higher volatility and price 
changes. Therefore, we widen the band to retain more observations. 
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20:30 and overnight 20:30–5:00. Our classification is very similar to Barclay and 
Hendershott [2003] and we have the following four periods, 7:00–9:30, 9:30–16:00, 
16:00-18:30, and 18:30–7:00.5
                                                          
5International markets may be open during the BMO or AMC periods. We examine the operating 
hours of the 15 largest stocks markets in 2009. Only stock markets in Europe (e.g. London Stock Exchange 
and Euronext) have few overlapping hours with the BMO and RTH periods while Toronto Stock Exchange 
is open at the same time as in the U.S.  No market is open in the AMC period. As we do not have access in 
other markets, the cross-market trading is not analyzed here. 
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of earnings announcements by time of release. 
Table 1, Panel A, presents the number of earnings announcements separated by primary 
exchange. 50% of quarterly earnings announcements are made in the BMO session and 
30% in the AMC session. Figure 1 provides a histogram of announcements by 30-minute 
intervals. Clearly, most of quarterly earnings announcements are made either in BMO or 
AMC sessions and companies are reluctant to release earning information during RTH. 
This is consistent with Bagnoli, Clement and Watts [2006] and Berkman and Truong 
[2009]. Table 1, Panel B, presents the number of announcements by year and shows that 






Quarterly Earnings Announcements, by Time of Day and by Year 
For NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, we present the distribution of quarterly earnings 
announcements (n = 10,238) by time of day (Panel A) and by year (Panel B) for the 582 
stocks in the S&P500 from January 2004 to December 2008. We report four times 
periods: before market open (BMO), 7:00 – 9:30; regular trading hours (RTH), 9:30 – 
16:00; after market close (AMC), 16:00 – 18:30; and overnight (OVR), 18:30 – 7:00.  
 
Panel A: Number of earnings announcements, by time of day 
    
Time of announcement NYSE  NASDAQ Total 
7:00 - 9:30 BMO 4,508  461  4,969  
9:30 - 16:00 RTH 447  77  524  
16:00 - 18:30 AMC 1,909  1,137  3,046  
18:30 - 7:00 OVR 1,548  151  1,699  
Total 8,412  1,826  10,238  
 
Panel B: Announcements, by time of day 
 NYSE NASDAQ 
Year BMO RTH AMC OVR Total BMO RTH AMC OVR Total 
 
Number 
       
2004 835 154 353 284 1,626 77 26 225 37 365 
2005 887 107 352 315 1,661 93 15 225 40 373 
2006 918 76 407 302 1,703 103 13 220 23 359 
2007 933 60 397 322 1,712 105 14 217 24 360 
2008 935 50 400 325 1,710 83 9 250 27 369 
 
Percentage 
       
2004 51.4 9.5 21.7 17.5 100.0 21.1 7.1 61.6 10.1 100.0 
2005 53.4 6.4 21.2 19.0 100.0 24.9 4.0 60.3 10.7 100.0 
2006 53.9 4.5 23.9 17.7 100.0 28.7 3.6 61.3 6.4 100.0 
2007 54.5 3.5 23.2 18.8 100.0 29.2 3.9 60.3 6.7 100.0 









FIG. 1.—Earnings announcements, by time of day. For each 30-minute interval from 
4:00 to 20:00 for the years 2004-2008, we present the percentage of earnings 





























































Table 2 presents descriptive statistics separately for announcement days and non-
announcement days and for various trading sessions. In Table 2, Panel A, we compare 
and contrast BMO, AMC, and RTH. The announcement day is the day that the quarterly 
earnings announcement is made, and the non-announcement days are the 10 days prior to 
and the 10 days following the announcement day.6
The number of trades and quotes are counted for each period.
 
7
Results reported in Table 2, Panel A, show that trading activities on 
announcement days are more intense across all periods compared to those on non-
announcement days. Not surprisingly, the RTH session has a much larger number of 
trades and quotes than the AMC and BMO sessions, regardless of whether there is an 
announcement. However, for both BMO and AMC sessions, we observe more active 
trading on announcement days.  
 Quoted spread is 
the time weighted average of the difference of the outstanding quotes. Effective spread is 
two times the volume weighted average of the absolute difference between the trade price 
and the prevailing quote midpoint. Relative quoted spread is the quoted spread divided by 
quote midpoint and relative effective spread is the effective spread divided by trade price. 
Total volume is the number of shares in millions traded in each period and dollar volume 
is the number of shares in millions multiplied by trade price. Trade size is the average 
number of shares per trade and market capitalization is the average daily price times the 
number of shares outstanding.  
                                                          
6 We do not include annual announcements in our sample as they typically fall on the same day as 
the last quarterly announcement of the year. 
7 Since our focus is on BMO and AMC, for brevity, we do not report activity overnight because 





We present descriptive statistics for stocks in the S&P500 index from January 2004 to December 2008. The earnings 
announcement dates and times are from I/B/E/S. We match the stock symbols and earnings announcement days from I/B/E/S 
with Compustat and Bloomberg. We obtain trade and quote data from TAQ, quarterly earnings announcements from I/B/E/S, 
S&P500 constituents from Compustat and market capitalization from CRSP. Number of trades and quotes are from TAQ. 
Quoted spread is the difference between the ask and bid prices, weighted by the time the quote is outstanding. Effective spread 
is the absolute difference between the trade price and the prevailing quote midpoint, multiplied by two and volume weighted. 
Relative quoted spread is the quoted spread divided by the quote midpoint and relative effective spread is the effective spread 
divided by the trade price. Volume is number of shares traded and Dollar Volume is the number of shares traded multiplied by 
the trade price. Trade size is the average number of shares per trade and market capitalization is the average daily share price 
times the number of shares outstanding. Panel A presents statistics for before market open (BMO), 7:00–9:30; regular trading 
hour (RTH), 9:30–16:00; and after market close (AMC), 16:00–18:30 on the announcement and non-announcement days. The 
announcement day is the day that quarterly earnings announcement is made, and the non-announcement days are 10 days prior 
to and 10 days following the announcement day. Panel B and C report statistics for quartiles ranked by dollar volume for BMO 
















TABLE 2 – Continued 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Announcement Days and Non-Announcement Days for Various Periods. 
  Number of Spread Volume* Dollar Trade 
Periods  Trades Quotes Quoted† Effective† Relative†† Rel.Eff.††  Volume** Size 
BMO Announcement 159 592 136.30 39.09 3.95 1.15 133 3,878 2,716 
 Non-
Announcement 44 267 169.57 60.27 4.75 1.59 55 1,807 9,255 
AMC Announcement 563 1,597 115.85 32.13 3.17 0.89 512 17,698 11,592 
Non-
Announcement 20 194 121.95 34.24 3.34 0.94 219 8,078 15,580 
RTH Announcement 16,677 109,913 11.43 5.20 0.29 0.14 7,230 249,683 546 
Non-
Announcement 10,544 83,382 14.16 7.48 0.35 0.19 3,985 137,763 452 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on Announcement Days for BMO for Quartiles ranked by Dollar Volume 
Quartile Number of Spread Volume* Dollar Trade 
 Trades Quotes Quoted† Effective† Relative†† Rel.Eff.††  Volume** Size 
1 6 98 180.36 43.47 5.44 1.46 2 63 500 
2 28 280 149.02 41.96 4.74 1.32 16 352 1,537 
3 75 364 125.07 39.99 3.35 1.04 47 1,603 2,298 
4 526 1,629 90.86 30.94 2.28 0.78 468 13,512 6,532 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics on Announcement Days for AMC Quartiles ranked by Dollar Volume 
Quartile Number of Spread Volume* Dollar Trade 
 Trades Quotes Quoted† Effective† Relative†† Rel.Eff.††  Volume** Size 
1 17 122 121.49 29.55 4.38 1.06 62 1,558 6,315 
2 29 187 134.04 33.43 3.28 0.89 104 3,702 9,552 
3 71 305 134.74 34.85 3.38 0.82 235 7,364 13,872 







Quoted spread and relative spread are proxies for trading costs. We find that 
trading costs are higher in the BMO and AMC compared with those in RTH. As reported 
by Barclay and Hendershott [2004], the effective spread and realized spread are much 
larger in the AHT than in RTH. However, when we compare the spreads on 
announcement and non-announcement days, we find that quoted spread and effective 
spread are smaller on the announcement days. The relative spread and relative effective 
spread that are the respective spreads scaled by price are also smaller on the 
announcement days. 
Consistent with the intuition, trading volume on announcement days is higher 
than on non-announcement days. Investors clearly react immediately to the arrival of new 
information. Also, the average trade size in AMC and BMO on announcement days is 
smaller than on the non-announcement days. This is consistent with the stealth trading 
hypothesis of Barclay and Warner [1993]. Despite the fact that the earning release is 
public information, informed traders still want to strategically fragmenting their orders to 
minimize the price impact.  
Statistics for quartiles ranked by dollar volume are reported in Table 2, Panels B 
and C. Stocks in the thickest quartile show significantly more active trading than stocks 
in the lower quartiles. We also scale the quoted spread and effect spread by stock price 
and find that spreads are lower for more actively traded stocks.  
Figure 2 presents trading volume by minute over the entire trading day. We 
aggregate the trading volume for each 30-minute interval for each stock and report 
average volume for announcement days and non-announcement days. We observe that 
trading volume on the announcement days is consistently higher during the entire day. 
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We see the spikes of volume in the morning and afternoon for both groups. Figure 2 
shows the familiar U-shape pattern of trading volume reported by McInish and Wood 
[1990]. Figure 3 displays number of trades and dollar volumes for each 30-minute 
interval before and after the earnings announcements is made. The first 30 minutes after 
the announcement is period 0. We report the total number of trades during each 30 
minutes. Dollar volume is trading price multiplied by volume. We aggregate the data for 
each stock in each interval and average across all stocks. In general, before earnings are 
released to public, investors are reluctant to take positions. Reactions are immediate after 
the announcements as trades are heavily concentrated in the first 30-minutes after 
announcements. The patterns for BMO and AMC differ. Figure 3, Panels A and B, 
present the BMO data. After announcements both number of trades and dollar volume 
increase dramatically. Trading activity remains heightened as the market open 
approaches. Figure 3, Panels C and D, the AMC data show a peak during the first 30 
minutes after the announcement, with trading intensity declining slowly in subsequent 






FIG. 2. – Daily trading volume, by time of day. For firms in the S&P500 for the years 
2004 to 2008, we plot average daily trading volume for announcement days and non-
announcement days by thirty-minute interval from 4:00 to 20:00. Trading volumes are 
aggregated first by day, then by stock, and then across stocks. We obtain trading data 
from TAQ and announcement days from I/B/E/S. The non-announcements days are the 












































































Panel A. Number of trades for BMO sample 
 
Panel B. Dollar volume for BMO sample 
FIG. 3. – Number of trades and dollar volume around the time of earnings 
announcements. We present the number of trades and dollar volumes for each 30-minute 
interval around the earnings announcement times for a sample of the firms included in 
S&P500 from 2004 to 2008. We obtain trading data from TAQ and announcement days 
from I/B/E/S. We define the first 30 minutes after the announcement time as period 0. 
The number of trades is counted from the beginning to the end of each interval. The 
dollar volume is trading price multiplied by volume. We summarize the data for each 
stock in each interval and average across stocks. Panels A and B demonstrate the number 
of trades and dollar volumes in thousands for BMO sample while Panels C and D present 

















































Panel C. Number of trades for AMC sample 
 
Panel D. Dollar volume for AMC sample 
 











































4. Research Methodologies 
4.1 WEIGHTED PRICE CONTRIBUTION (WPC) 
To study the effect of earning announcements on price discovery, we use the 
weighted price contribution (WPC) of Barclay and Warner [1993]. WPC computes the 
fraction of price changes during a given period relative to price changes over a 24-hour 
period stock return (close-to-close). Barclay and Warner [1993] use the WPC to examine 
price changes associated with trades of different sizes and to identify which trade size 
moves prices. Cao, Ghysels and Hatheway [2000] use relative time-weighted price 
contribution (RTWPC) to study the contribution of pre-opening to the daily price change 
and contribution of the crossed and locked period on the NASDAQ. They partition the 
preopening and trading hours into five periods including pre-cross/lock, lock, cross, post-
cross/lock and trading period. The price contribution of each period is scaled by the 
length of trading time in each period. Barclay and Hendershott [2003] study the price 
discovery of AHT on 250 stocks with the largest trading volumes on NASDAQ. In sum, 
WPC has been widely used in the literature to measure magnitude of price discovery in 
different trading periods. Using WPC, we can compare the level of price discovery across 
periods. In addition, weighted price contribution per trade (WPCT) can be used to 
appropriately account for the low amount of trades during market close.  
Following Barclay and Hendershott [2003], we compute WPC as 
     S S 
 WPCi = ∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(reti,s/rets)] (1) 
   s=1 s=1 
WPCi is the weighted price contribution in period i. reti,s is the log-return during the 
period i for the stock s.  
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We calculate WPC over a number of periods. The return from announcement to 
the end of day is the log return from the first trade after the announcement time to the last 
trade of the day before 18:30. The return for BMO is log return from the first trade that 
occurs after 7:00 to the opening trade at 9:30. The regular trading day return is the log 
return of first trade at 9:30 to the last trade at 16:00. rets is calculated as the 
announcement-to-close price of the same day (next day) for BMO (AMC) 
announcements. WPC is calculated for the full sample of all qualified stocks as well as 
for NYSE and NASDAQ-list stocks. 
We also use the WPCT calculated as  
  S S 
  WPCTi = WPCi /∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(nti,s/nts)] (2) 
   s=1 s=1 
where nti,s is the number of trades in each time period i for stock s. For BMO (AMC), we 
define nts as the total number of trades from the announcement time to the close of the 
same day (next day). Barclay and Hendershott [2003] argue that WPCT will be close to 
one if all trades are equally informative because it is the fraction of the total price change 
divided by the fraction of trades that occurs in a given time period.  
4.2. PRICE DISCOVERY FROM PRIVATE INFORMATION 
Hasbrouck [1991a] proposes the vector autoregressive (VAR) model to measure 
the impact of a trade on price due to asymmetry information and proportion of private 
information inferred from a trade. The idea of the model is that the market-maker revises 
his bid and ask quotes following a trade to adjust for information content of trade. Based 
on the direction of trade, the market-maker adjusts new quotes to reflect the true value of 
the stock. The VAR model measures how private information is impounded into asset 
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prices through trades. Hasbrouck [1991a] assume the true value of a stock is the 
midpoint, pt, which consists of a random-walk component mt and a stationary component, 
st: pt = mt + st, where mt = mt-1 + vt and vt is assumed to be normal distribution with zero 
mean and constant variance. E(vt,vs) = 0 for t≠s. The random walk component (mt) is 
referred to as the permanent component of the price and the stationary component (st) as 
the transitory component of the price. Variances of the error terms are defined as 
VAR(ν1,t) = E(ε
2
1,t)  and VAR(ν2,t) = E(ε
2
2,t). The variance of the permanent price change 
can be decomposed into price change caused by the arrival of public information and by 
private information. The VAR model is  
  p p 
 rt = ∑ai rt-i + ∑bi xt-i + ν1,t (3a) 
  i=1 i=0  
  p p 
 xt = ∑ci rt-i + ∑di xt-i + ν2,t (3b) 
  i=1 i=1  
where a’s, b’s, c’s and d’s are coefficients of lagged terms of quote returns and trade 
directions, and v1,t and v2,t are the disturbance. xt is direction of trade (+1 for buy and -1 
for sell order) and rt is the log return of quote midpoint change following a trade. Note 
that the contemporaneous value of xt is included in equation (3a) as the revision of the 
quote follows the trade but not vice versa. The VAR model can be inverted into vector 
moving average (VMA) representation as shown in Hasbrouck [1991b]8
                                                          
8 We thank Joel Hasbrouck for providing SAS code on his website. 
. The coefficients 
of the lag polynomials in the VMA representation are the impulse response functions 
implied by the VAR. The proportion of private information from trades can be obtained 
from the variance decomposition method. Under the assumption of invertability, a linear 
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function of quotes return and trades can be expressed in VMA representation. The VMA 
coefficients are calculated by inverting VAR model to 
  ∞ ∞ 
 rt = (ν1,t +∑ai*ν1,t-i )+ ∑bi*ν2,t-i (4a) 
 i=1 i=0  
 ∞ ∞ 
 xt = ∑ci*ν1,t-i + (ν2,t + ∑di*ν2,t-i) (4a) 
  i=1  i=1  
Following Hasbrouck [1991b], we decompose the variance of the random-walk 
component of the quote changes into the change caused by the arrival of public 
information and private information from the following equation. 












 i=0 i=0 
 ∞ 
The value of ( ∑bi)
2
  represents the component of price discovery from private  
   i=0 
information revealed through trades. Variance decomposition technique is applied to data 
of BMO and AMC announcements. In theory, the lagged terms can be of infinite order 
but in empirical test, the lagged terms are truncated. Barclay and Hendershott [2003] 
estimate the VAR system using 10 lag terms and VMA using 20 lags and we do likewise. 
To estimate the model, we require our sample stocks to have a minimum of 50 
trades and quotes from the announcement time to 9:30 for BMO and from the 
announcement time to 18:30 for AMC on the announcement days. Following Hasbrouck 
[1991b], we use the last quote if there is more than one quote with the same time stamp. 
Trades with the same time stamp and same price are combined into one transaction. If a 
quote update occurs within 5 seconds following a trade, it is assigned the same time 
subscript t. We use the prevailing quote midpoint outstanding prior to the trade arrival. If 
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the trade price is above (below) the prevailing quote midpoint, it is a buy (sell). We lag 
trades by 1 second as suggested by Henker and Wang [2006]. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. WEIGHTED PRICE CONTRIBUTION (WPC) 
Table 3 presents the WPC for the BMO and AMC. In Table 3, Panel A, we report 
the WPC for the BMO announcement from the announcement time to market open (9:30) 
and from the market open (9:30) to the market close (16:00) to demonstrate the overall 
picture of price change effect from the time of announcement. WPC is 36% over the 
period from the announcement time to the opening price. The larger portion is 
contributed by the trades during RTH.  
In Table 3, Panel B, that for AMC announcements, 56% of the WPC is from the 
announcement time to the opening price the next trading day. Unlike the BMO 
announcements, investors have more time if the announcement is made in AMC before 
the next day’s RTH. Investors who have access to AHT act upon the news before RTH of 
the next day.  
We also examine NYSE and NASDAQ stocks separately. For BMO 
announcements, we find that 36%-40% of WPC is from the announcement time to the 
opening price while the larger portion of WPC is contributed from RTH trades. For AMC 
announcements, 47%-64% of WPC is from the announcement time to the next day’s 
opening price. The large price change for the AMC announcements is consistent with 
Cliff, Cooper and Gulen [2008] who document that the return overnight is the primary 
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source of U.S. equity premium with the exception that we condition on the stock prices 
response when the quarterly earnings are made public 
Since the AMC announcement has longer time for investors to react, we examine 
the WPC for three sub-periods in greater detail. Most of price contribution comes 
immediately after the announcement and by the end of the AMC session 42-51% of price 
change has occurred. The WPC from the overnight return and BMO of the next day are 
minimal. Trading during the subsequent RTH contributes the remaining WPC.  
Our results differ from Barclay and Hendershott [2003] who report that the price 
changes in BMO are larger than AMC and that the largest portion of 24-hour price 
change (close-to-close) is from the RTH. We believe that these differences can be 
attributed to the fact that we examine the price change on the earnings announcements 
days while Barclay and Hendershott [2003] study the overall after-hours periods without 
conditioning on any informational event. In addition, we focus on the price change due to 
the earnings announcement; therefore, the total return of the event day (rets) is not exactly 






Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) and Weighted Price Contribution per Trade 
(WPCT) for BMO and AMC Announcements 
We examine the weighted price contribution (WPC) and weighted price contribution per 
trade (WPCT) for BMO and AMC announcements for S&P500 stocks during 2004 to 
2008. BMO announcements occur from 7:00 to 9:30 and AMC announcements occur 
from 16:00 to 18:30. For BMO announcements, we measure the price contribution from 
(1) the announcement time to 9:30, and (2) 9:30 to 16:00. For AMC announcements, we 
measure the price contribution from (1) the announcement time to 18:30, (2) 7:00 to 9:30, 
and (3) 9:30 to 16:00. The WPC for period i is: 
     S S 
 WPCi = ∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(reti,s/rets)] (1) 
   s=1 s=1 
Where reti,s is the log return during period i for the stock s. rets is calculated as the 
announcement-to-close price of t = 0, nts is the total number of trades from the 
announcement time to the close on t = 0 and nti,s is the number of trades in each time 
period i for stock s. The WPCT for period i is: 
  S S 
  WPCTi = WPCi /∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(nti,s/nts)] (2) 
   s=1 s=1 
In each case, we present results for the entire sample and for the NYSE and NASDAQ 
stocks. The WPC results for BMO and AMC announcements are presented in Panels A 
and B and the WPCT results for BMO and AMC are presented in Panels C and D, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: WPC for BMO announcements 
Price contribution period 
  
Announcement  















   
 
Panel B: WPC for AMC announcements 
 
Announcement  
to 18:30 7:00 to 9:30 9:30 to 16:00 
Entire 0.42 0.14 0.40 
sample    
NYSE 0.32 0.15 0.47 
    
NASDAQ 0.51 0.13 0.33 




TABLE 3 – Continued  
Panel C. WPCT for BMO announcements 



















    
Panel D. WPCT for AMC announcements 
 
Announcement  
to 18:30 7:00 to 9:30 9:30 to 16:00 




 NYSE 20.76 26.82 0.48 
  
 








Next, we present the results of WPCT for the same sample for the BMO and AMC 
announcements in Table 3, Panels C and D. Barclay and Hendershott [2003] argue that 
the value of WPCT will be close to one if every trade conveys equal information. We find 
a similar pattern that WPCT of AHT are greater than one across all sample and sub-
periods, compared with WPCT less than one during RTH. In contrast to the WPC results, 
trading in BMO is more informative than AMC when measured per trade. The WPCT of 
BMO sample is 45 while it is only 10 for the AMC sample. Even though the length of 
BMO is shorter, trades are more likely from informed traders. Holden and Subramanyam 
[1992] present a model in which informed investors facing competition want to use their 
private information as quickly as possible.   
Since we find that WPC in the AHT sessions are relatively high compared to the 
RTH for the announcement day, this should not be the case for days without significant 
informational events such as earnings announcements. To verify this, we compare WPC 
on announcements days and several days before and after the announcement day. We 
examine whether the WPC on event days are significantly different from other days, and 
report the results in Table 4.   
The WPC of the announcement day is denoted as day 0. Five days prior to the 
event are denoted as [-5] to [-1] and five days following the event are [+1] to [+5]. For 
brevity, we report the results for the announcement day, denoted as [0], one day prior to 
and following the announcement, denoted as [-1] and [+1], and the average of price 
discovery for two to five days prior to and following the announcement, denoted as [-2 to 
-5] and [+2 to +5], respectively. As there are no exact starting and ending times for AHT 
on the non-announcement days, we calculate the price contribution based on the entire 
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period. Specifically, for the BMO sample, WPC is calculated for 7:00-9:30 and 9:30-
16:00. For the AMC sample, WPC is calculated for 16:00-18:30, 7:00-9:30, and 9:30-
16:00. We find that for both BMO and AMC samples, the price contributions in the AHT 
periods are significantly larger only on announcement days. For the BMO sample, the 
WPC surrounding the announcement days ranges from 16% to 24% while the largest 
contributions are from the RTH period. Similarly, for the AMC sample, WPCs during the 
AMC periods, and BMO periods of the following day are significantly smaller than that 
of the announcement day. The WPC in the AMC period is from 2% to 8% and BMO 
period from 1% to 6%. The significance level of price contribution is derived from the 
RTH. Thus, the results are consistent with our earlier notion that information 






Robustness Test of WPC around the Earnings Announcement Days 
We estimate the weighted price contribution for the announcement days and 5 days prior 
and 5 days after. We include only stocks that have sufficient trades to compute WPC in 
the BMO and AMC sessions during 5 days surrounding the announcement date. For 
brevity, we present the result for day 0, -1, +1, the average of days -2 to -5 and the 
average of days +2 to +5. Panel A presents the results for BMO announcement sample 
and Panel B presents the results for AMC announcement sample.  
 
Panel A: WPC surrounding the BMO announcements 
   7:00 to 9:30 9:30 to 16:00 
Day   WPC t-stat WPC t-stat 
[-2 to -5]  
 
0.17 20.99** 0.83 -4.11** 
[-1]  
 
0.18 17.88** 0.82 -3.16** 
[0]   0.36  
0.64 
 [+1]  
 
0.21 15.25** 0.80 -2.90** 
[+2 to +5]  
 
0.21 22.10** 0.79 -2.39* 
 
Panel B: WPC surrounding theAMC announcements 
 16:00 to 18:30 7:00 to 9:30 9:30 to 16:00 
Day  t-stat  t-stat  t-stat 
[-2 to -5] 0.04 36.29** 0.02 5.78** 0.79 -4.33** 






 [+1] 0.03 45.39
** 0.01 6.53** 0.81 -5.11** 
[+2 to +5] 0.03 50.21** 0.03 2.89** 0.84 -6.78** 
 
∗Significant at the 0.05 level 
∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level  
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5.2. CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON WEIGHTED PRICE 
CONTRIBUTION 
To gain insights on the factors that influence the magnitude of WPC, we perform 
a cross-sectional analysis to examine the relation between WPC and several 
characteristics of the stocks. Foster, Olsen and Shevlin [1984] show that firms with a 
greater number of analysts following experience higher abnormal price changes. Barclay 
and Hendershott [2008] regress WPC on the fraction of trading activity in the BMO and 
also on variables such as log market capitalization and daily dollar volume that control 
for stock characteristics. They report a higher price contribution following unexpectedly 
high pre-open trading volume. Greene and Watts [1996] report that stocks react 
differently to earnings announcements made during the different time periods. For the 
announcements in the non-trading period, price changes occur immediately when the 
market opens. The adjustment is smoother for the RTH announcements. Similarly, 
Masulis and Srivakumar [2002] find that NASDAQ stock prices can adjust faster than 
NYSE/AMEX stocks on the event of seasoned stock offering. Barclay and Hendershott 
[2003] find that the BMO session has a higher level of price contribution per trade than 
AMC. 
Consistent with the approach in the prior literature, we include the number of 
analysts, earnings surprises, daily dollar volume and market capitalization in our 
regression. We include the dummy variables to control for the time of announcements, 
and primary listing exchanges. 
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We use WPC, the proportion of individual return from earnings announcements to 
the total price change, as the dependent variable. We estimate the following OLS 
regression. 
WPC = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size +  
β5AMC + β6NYSE + ε (6) 
where Analysts is the number of analysts following a stock reported in I/B/E/S details 
files for each quarter. Surprise is the difference of actual earnings and average analysts 
forecast for each quarter of each stock divided by the standard deviation of analyst 
estimates. Volume is the average log value of one-month daily trading volume prior to the 
announcement date. Firm_Size is the average log value of market capitalization a month 
before the announcement day. AMC is a control variable for the announcement period. 
AMC is 1 for AMC and 0 for BMO. NYSE is a control variable for the primary exchange 
of the sample stocks. NYSE is 1 for NYSE-listed stocks and 0 for NASDAQ-listed 
stocks. 
The regression results are reported in Table 5. We report four alternative 
specifications. Analysts is significantly positive only in the first model. Surprise is not 
statistically significant across all models. Our findings differ from the results on PEAD 
phenomenon, which shows that the returns over the longer term are closely related to the 
direction and the magnitude of the earnings surprises. Volume has a strong positive 
impact on WPC. On the contrary Firm_Size has a significant negative impact on the WPC 
in AHT. The results are robust across all models. Additionally, we find that AMC and 
NYSE also are significant. The dummy for AMC shows a significant positive relation to 
the WPC in both models 2 and 4, indicating that the earnings announcements made in 
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AMC have higher price changes. The coefficients for primary exchange are negative, 
indicating that stocks listed on NYSE tend to have lower WPC. This is in line with 
Masulis and Shivakumar [2002] who also report that NYSE stocks have slower price 
adjustment than those on NASDAQ. 
5.3. PRICE DISCOVERY FROM PRIVATE INFORMATION 
We examine price discovery based on the methodology proposed in Hasbrouck 
[1991a, b]. We use trades and quotes of AHT from TAQ database to estimate the fraction 
of price discovery from private information for AMC and BMO announcements. We only 
include earnings announcements occurring during AMC and BMO periods. Hasbrouck 
[1991b] restricts his sample firms to have at least 500 observations in shorter trading 
periods for intraday analysis.9
                                                          
9Hasbrouck (1991b, p.589). 
 We do the same because AHT is usually very thin 
compared to the RTH. Many stocks have no trading activity recorded on TAQ before 
9:30 and after 16:00. Since the model requires lagged values of trades and quote based 
returns, we need to have a sufficient number of trades and quotes to obtain meaningful 
results. We apply a stricter rule to ensure that there are sufficient observations to estimate 
the model. First, a stock must have at least 50 trades and quotes on the earnings 
announcement days. In the TAQ database, quotes sometimes occur without any trades or 
trades without quote during the pre-market or after-close. For comparison purpose, we 
have to estimate the price discovery for the stocks around announcement days. We 
therefore impose the second filter that there must be sufficient observations to estimate 
the results around the announcement day. For non-announcement days, some stocks have 
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no trading activity at all. The wider the window is, the fewer observations we obtain. 
Therefore, we choose to examine a 5-day window before and after the announcement 
days. 
In Table 6, we present the price discovery results for AHT following earnings 
announcements. We find that price discovery during the BMO period is 29.9% and AMC 
is 37.0%. We also report the level of price discovery for groups ranked by dollar trading 
volume in AHT. We find a positive relationship between trading volume and price 
discovery. For the BMO announcements, we find a slight increase in price discovery with 
trading volume from the lowest group at 28.0% to the highest group at 32.5%. For the 
AMC announcements, we find a stronger relationship as price discovery increases from 
34.4% for the lowest trading volume group to 39.2% for the most actively traded group.  
Although there seem to be a significant amount of price discovery from private 
information through AHT on announcement days, we are interested in understanding 
whether more active price discovery occurs on event days (as opposed to AHT on non-
event days). To address this issue, we compare and contrast the price discovery on the 
event days and non-event days and report the results in Table 7. The price discovery of 
the announcement day is denoted as day 0. We examine five days prior to the event and 
five days following the event. For brevity, we report the result for the announcement day, 
denoted as [0], one day prior to and following the announcement, denoted as [-1] and 
[+1], and the average of price discovery for two to five days prior to and following the 
announcement, denoted as [-2 to -5] and [+2 to +5], respectively. Because there are no 
exact starting and ending times for AHT on the non-announcement days, we use two 




Cross-sectional Analysis of Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) 
We report results of the regression of WPC against explanatory variables. The WPC for 
period i is: 
     S S 
 WPCi = ∑[(|rets|/ ∑|rets|)·(reti,s/rets)] (1) 
   s=1 s=1 
 
Where reti,s is the log return during period i for the stock s. rets is calculated as the 
announcement-to-close price of t = 0. The regression is:  
 
WPC = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size +  
β5AMC + β6NYSE + ε (6) 
where Analysts is the number of analysts following a firm reported in I/B/E/S details files 
for each quarter. Surprise is the difference between actual earnings and average analysts 
forecast for each quarter for each stock divided by the standard deviation of analyst 
estimates. Volume is the average log value of daily trading volume one month prior to the 
announcement day. Firm_Size is the average log value of market capitalization one 
month before the announcement day. Two dummy variables are used. AMC is a control 
variable that equals 1 for AMC and 0 for BMO announcements. NYSE equals 1 for 
NYSE-listed stocks and 0 for NASDAQ-listed stocks.  
Independent 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Intercept 0.0439 0.0288 0.0486 0.0336 
 6.05
*** 4.01*** 6.75*** 4.67*** 
Analysts 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 
 3.39
*** -0.15 1.01 -1.08 
Surprises 0.0107 0.0085 0.0013 0.0032 
 0.67 0.54 0.08 0.20 Volume 0.0043 0.0033 0.0031 0.0027 
 9.05
*** 6.93*** 6.34*** 5.55*** 
Firm_Size -0.0058 -0.0040 -0.0042 -0.0033 
 -11.95*** -8.16*** -8.39*** -6.55*** 
AMC  0.0149  0.0129 
  15.56***  12.86*** 
NYSE   -0.0119 -0.0071 
   -10.60*** -6.10*** 
 





First, we estimate the price discovery based on the entire period, that is, trades and quotes 
from 7:00 to 9:30 for BMO and 16:00 to 18:30 for AMC. Second, we use the time of 
announcement to the end of the respective AHT trading sessions for the ten-day window 
surrounding the event. We find similar patterns of price discovery except in a few cases. 
Hence, we present the results based on the sample using the entire period of the AHT 
session. We confirm that price discovery is the highest on earnings announcement days. 
As reported in Table 6, for the BMO announcement, price discovery during the period 
from announcement time to before market open is about 29.9%. For the AMC, price 
discovery is 37.0%. The highest percentage of price discovery is also found for NYSE 
and NASDAQ sub-samples on the announcement days. Other days surrounding the 
events are noticeably lower. T-statistics and the significance levels of standard paired t-
test are presented. The price discovery on the announcement day is significantly different 
from other days. Figure 4 depicts the price discovery on each day over the 11-day 
window (the announcement day, 5 days before, and 5 days after). In general, BMO 
sessions have relatively higher price discovery than the AMC sessions. Except on the 
announcement day, the price discovery for the AMC session is higher than BMO. This is 
quite consistent with the fact that overnight news in the world markets and scheduled 
macroeconomic news releases often drive the early session and provide investors 





Price Discovery for BMO and AMC Announcements 
We report the price discovery for earnings announcement of stocks listed in S&P500 
during 2004 to 2008. We define price discovery as the proportion of private information 
to total information. We use method proposed by Hasbrouck [1991a] to measure price 
discovery. Our model uses quote revisions, the log return of mid-quote change, and 
signed trades. Trades are lagged for 1 second to match the prevailing quote. Due to lack 
of trading activity during the after- hours sessions, we restrict the sample stocks to have a 
minimum of 50 trades and quotes from the announcement time to 9:30 for BMO and 
from the announcement time to 18:30 for AMC announcements. Following Barclay and 
Hendershott [2003], we use 20 lags. For the AMC and BMO announcements, in turn, we 
report results for the overall sample and for quartiles based on after-hours trading 
volume. F-statistics for testing the null hypothesis of equal means among the four 













1 (thin) 0.280 0.344 
2 0.291 0.356 
3 0.299 0.389 
4 (thick) 0.325 0.392 
 
F-statistics 2.07** 3.53** 
 







Panel A. BMO announcements 
 
Panel B. AMC announcements 
 
FIG. 4.–Price  discovery around BMO and AMC announcements. We estimate the ratio 
of private information to total information using the approach of Hasbrouck [1991a, b]. 
For BMO and AMC announcements, we plot the means and medians of this ratio 






























Robustness Test of Price Discovery around the Earnings Announcement Days 
We estimate the price discovery for the announcement days and 5 days prior and 5 days 
after. We use the method proposed by Hasbrouck [1991a] to measure price discovery. 
Our model uses quote revisions, the log return of mid-quote change, and signed trades. 
Trades are lagged for 1 second to match the prevailing quote. We require sample stocks 
to have a minimum of 50 trades and quotes from the announcement time to 9:30 (18:30) 
for BMO (AMC). Following Barclay and Hendershott [2003], we use 20 lags. Panel A 
presents the results for the overall sample. For brevity, we present the results for day 0,    
-1, +1, the average of days -2 to -5 and the average of days +2 to +5. Panels B and C 
present the results for NYSE-listed stocks and NASDAQ-listed stocks, respectively.  
 
Day BMO t-stat AMC t-stat 
Panel A. Overall sample 
[-2 to -5] 0.231 5.56*** 0.180 29.79*** 




 [+1] 0.247 3.36*** 0.205 19.91*** 
[+2 to +5] 0.226 6.12*** 0.173 31.18*** 
 
 
Panel B. NYSE-listed stocks 
[-2 to -5] 0.255 3.81*** 0.225 8.19*** 




 [+1] 0.263 2.45** 0.233 5.83*** 
[+2 to +5] 0.226 6.12*** 0.173 31.18*** 
 
 
Panel C. NASDAQ-listed stocks 
[-2 to -5] 0.202 4.06*** 0.166 33.04*** 




 [+1] 0.229 2.28** 0.192 20.90*** 
[+2 to +5] 0.194 4.59*** 0.165 33.45*** 
 
∗∗Significant at the 0.05 level 





5.4 CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON PRICE DISCOVERY 
Price discovery varies cross sectionally. In this section, we examine the 
relationship between price discovery subsequent to after-hours earnings announcement 
and several explanatory variables. Atiase [1985] finds that a firm’s size has a negative 
relation to unexpected earnings. He argues that large firms have more pre-disclosure 
information available to investors. As a result, reaction to the actual earnings 
announcements is lower. Shores [1990] uses a firm’s size and number of analysts to 
proxy for interim information and find a negative relation between market reactions and 
firm’s size and number of analysts. Gleason and Lee [2003] report a faster price 
adjustment subsequent to announcements for stocks that receive greater analyst coverage. 
Turning to PEAD, Foster, Olsen and Shevlin [1984] find that the sign and 
magnitude of unexpected earnings can affect price changes. Obviously earnings surprises 
play an important role in PEAD when measured over the longer time period (5 days to 
quarters). However, previous studies do not consider the impact of earnings surprises on 
price discovery during AHT.  
Libby, Mathieu and Robb [2002] find that spreads are relatively wider following 
earnings announcements on the Toronto Stock Exchange. In contrast, Pronk [2006] finds 
that spreads are narrower for NYSE and AMEX firms. We include the spread during 
AHT following earnings announcements to test whether the spread is related to price 
discovery. Trading volume around the earnings announcement is also important. While 
McInish, Van Ness and Van Ness [2002] report that actively traded stocks tend to be 
active in the after-hours, abnormal volume are usually observed on the event day 
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(Garfinkel and Sokobin [2006]). Thus, we adopt the average daily trading volume to 
distinguish these effects from the firm’s size. 
Timing of announcement can make a difference. Prior research shows that stock 
prices react differently to earnings announcements made during the trading hours and 
when market is closed (Francis, Pagach and Stephan [1992]). Barclay and Hendershott 
[2003] find that the BMO session experiences higher level of price discovery than AMC. 
Lastly, difference in market structure between the NYSE and NASDAQ can also affect 
price discovery. Greene and Watts [1996] and Masulis and Shivakumar [2002] report that 
market structure causes the price adjustments on NASDAQ to be different from that on 
NYSE.  
We employ linear regression to examine relationship between the price discovery 
and explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the price discovery of AHT 
following earnings announcements. Most of the independent variables are the same as 
defined in section 5.2.We include an additional determinant, AHspread, which is the 
relative effective spread of the corresponding AHT session on the announcement day. 
Price discovery = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size + 
β5AHspread + β6AMC + β7NYSE + ε (7) 
The OLS regression results reported in Table 8 indicate that Analysts and Surprise 
do not play an important role in price discovery in the short run. We find that daily 
Volume and Firm_Size are significant determinants of price discovery. The positive 
relation between Volume and price discovery lends support to the previous findings of the 
abnormal volume on the announcement day. The volume can be from informed traders 
who possess private information and wish to capitalize on their informational advantage 
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in a timely fashion. Firm_Size has a negative relation with price discovery following the 
earnings announcements in AHT. In addition, we examine the liquidity effect during the 
AHT on price discovery by using the relative effective spread from the corresponding 
AHT session. Negative coefficients of after-hours spreads support the notion that market 
friction lowers the price discovery since spreads are interpreted as trading costs to 
investors. Higher spread is obviously an indication of friction to investors who wish to 
trade the stocks in AHT and hinders price discovery process in non-normal trading hours. 
We obtain consistent results from AMC and NYSE dummy variables across 
different regressions. The dummy AMC shows positive and significant coefficients, 
which indicates that earnings announcements made during AMC are associated with a 
higher level of price discovery than those made in BMO period. The coefficient for 
dummy NYSE is significantly negative, meaning that stocks that are listed on NYSE 






Regression Analysis of Price Discovery 
We present the results of the regression of price discovery on our independent variables 
for earnings announcement of stocks listed in S&P500 during 2004 to 2008. We use 
method proposed by Hasbrouck [1991a] to measure price discovery. Our model uses 
quote revisions, the log return of mid-quote change, and signed trades. Trades are lagged 
for 1 second to match the prevailing quote. We estimate the following regression model: 
Price discovery = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size + 
β5AHspread + β6AMC + β7NYSE + ε (7) 
where Analysts is the number of analysts following a firm reported in I/B/E/S details files 
for each quarter. Surprise is the difference between actual earnings and average analysts 
forecast for each quarter for each stock divided by the standard deviation of analyst 
estimates. Volume is the average log value of one-month daily trading volume prior to the 
announcement day. Firm_Size is the average log value of one-month market 
capitalization before the announcement day. AHspread is the relative effective spread of 
the corresponding after-hour period on the announcement day. AMC is a control variable 
that equals 1 for AMC and 0 for BMO announcements. NYSE equals 1 for NYSE-listed 
stocks and 0 for NASDAQ-listed stocks. We combine the AMC and BMO 
announcements. We estimate the model separately for AMC announcements and for 
BMO announcements. The t-statistics of the coefficients are reported in italic.  
Independent Variables 1 2 
Intercept -0.1332 -0.0551 
 -1.34 -0.54 Analysts 0.0013 0.0012 
 1.47 1.36 Surprise -0.0945 -0.0749 
 -0.74 -0.59 Volume 0.0413 0.0391 
 4.56
*** 4.32*** 
Firm_Size -0.0215 -0.0232 
 -2.76*** -2.98*** 
AHspread  -0.0114 
  -3.13*** 
AMC 0.0632 0.0679 
 4.57*** 4.90*** 
NYSE -0.0521 -0.0475 
 -4.61*** -4.18*** 





5.5 THE EFFICIENCY OF PRICE DISCOVERY AFTER EARNINGS 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
RHT is very different from AHT trading. Lack of liquidity and high trading costs 
can impede efficient price discovery. AHT costs can be large and create high temporary 
price impact (Barclay and Hendershott [2003]). Trading prices around earnings 
announcements moment tend to be noisy due to investors speculation, and heterogeneous 
interpretation of the information (Garfinkel and Sokobin [2006]). We use the method 
suggested by Biais, Hillion and Spatt [1999] to estimate the noisiness of stock return and 
efficiency of price discovery after earnings announcements. As suggested in Barclay and 
Hendershott [2003], the slope coefficient of the regression can be interpreted as a signal 
to noise ratio. Since we focus on the earnings announcement events only and the 
announcement times vary from one company to another, we are not able to segment the 
regression into intervals to measure price efficiency as in their paper. Instead, we regress 
the announcement-to-close return on the return from announcement-to-open since our 
primary event of interest starts at the earnings announcement time. An earnings 
announcement occurs on day t=0, which begins with the first trade or quote following the 
most recent market close prior to the announcement and ends with the next market 
closing price after the announcement. To capture the effect from the announcement, we 
use the last trade price before the announcement to the opening and close price of the 
RTH. Specifically, for BMO, the returns are calculated from the last trading price before 
the announcement to the opening price (rao), and to the close price (rac) of the same day. 
For AMC, the returns are calculated from the last trading price before the announcement 
to the opening price (rao), and to the close price (rac) of the next day. 
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 rac = α + βrao+εi  (8) 
Since our focus is the immediate reaction of return after the announcement, we 
treat each earnings announcement event as one observation. We estimate the regression 
for overall sample and separately for BMO and AMC sample. Because the BMO 
announcement is closer to the RTH, traders have less time to assimilate earnings 
information compared to the AMC announcements when traders have overnight. In 
addition, BMO announcements may also occur concurrently on days with economic 
news. Therefore, it is of interest to investigate whether the efficiency of returns differs for 
BMO and AMC periods.  
Table 9 presents the results of price efficiency of sample. In general, the 
coefficient is close to one in all cases. The beta coefficient is 0.99 for the full sample. In 
Table 9, Panels B and C, the BMO subsample has a beta coefficient of 0.978 while the 
coefficient of AMC is 1.017. None of the alpha coefficients are significantly different 
from zero. Thus, the price reactions on the earnings announcements are quite efficient. 
Barclay and Hendershott [2003] suggest that there seem to be more noise for BMO than 
AMC after the announcement is made. This happens because market has less time to 
interpret earnings information and investors may have divergence opinions.  
Since most of the trades in reaction to earnings news in AMC occur immediately 
following the announcements (often within half an hour of the close of the market), we 
also conduct additional tests for the AMC sub-sample to study more closely the price 
efficiency for the period from the first trade after the announcement to 18:30. We regress 
the announcement-to-close return (rac) on the return from announcement to 18:30. The 
57 
 
results (not reported for brevity) are qualitatively similar. The beta coefficient is at 1.076 
and is significantly at the 1% level, indicating a slight overreaction in the AMC session. 
 
TABLE 9 
 The Efficiency of Return 
An earnings announcement occurs on day t=0, which begins with the first trade or quote 
following the most recent market close prior to the announcement and ends with the next 
market closing price after the announcement. For announcements that occur during the 
BMO, the announcement-to-close return is regressed on the return from the 
announcement-to-open. For announcements that occur during AMC, the return from 
announcement-to-close of day t=0 is regressed on return from the announcement to the 
following open.  
 
 rac = α + βrao+εi  (8) 
These simple OLS regressions are used to measure the efficiency of price as suggested by 
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt [1999]. One earnings announcement is treated as a single 
observation. The dependent variable is rac and the independent variable is rao. The sample 
consists of 582 stocks included in the S&P500 during the years 2004-2008. The earnings 
announcement days and times are from I/B/E/S. We match the stocks symbols and 
earnings announcement days from I/B/E/S with Compustat and Bloomberg to ensure data 
integrity. Panel A shows the regression result from the full sample. Panel B and C report 
the results separately for BMO and AMC. The t-statistics are reported in italic.  
 
Panel A: The full sample Coefficient Estimates t-statistics 
α -0.001 -1.431 
β 0.999 87. 24*** 
 
Panel B: The BMO sub-sample 
α -0.001 -1.179 
β 0.978 60.76*** 
   
Panel C: The AMC sub-sample 
α  0.000 -0.283 
β  1.017 60.522*** 
 





6. Robustness Test on the Impact of Macroeconomics Announcements 
BMO earnings announcements may sometime coincide with the scheduled 
macroeconomic announcement such as unemployment, GDP or CPI. Adams, McQueen 
and Wood [1999] find a significant impact of inflation on large cap stock prices. Poitras 
[2004], however, finds that the announcement variables contribute very little to daily 
price changes and have weak explanatory power.  
To investigate whether the macroeconomic announcements affect the price 
change and price discovery related to the earnings announcements of the firms, we run 
the regression analysis by adding the macroeconomic event as an additional dummy 
variable. We collect a set of macroeconomic announcements from the website during our 
study period.10 To be consistent with prior studies, the macroeconomic variables we use 
are GDP, CPI, PPI and unemployment data. The GDP data is usually released on the last 
Friday of January, April, July and October for the previous quarter. Each quarter's data 
are revised in each of the following two months after the initial release. The 
unemployment data is usually released on the first Friday of the month. The CPI and PPI 
are usually released on the 11th and 13th business day of the month, respectively. All news 
is scheduled to be released at 8:30 A.M. (EST). The maximum possible number of each 
event is 60 distinct days.11
                                                          
10www.econoday.com 
11 GDP are released on quarterly basis. With the initial release plus two revisions for each quarter, 
there are 12 event dates for each year. Employment and inflation data are released on monthly basis. Thus, 
for our 5 year sample period, we have 60 event days for all the variables considered. 
 We match each of the macroeconomic announcements with 
our S&P500 sample for BMO announcements. We find that 227, 56, 150 and 157 
earnings announcements in our sample occur on the same day as the release days of GDP, 
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unemployment, CPI and PPI, respectively. We set the dummy variable ECON equals 1 if 
one of these variables coincides with BMO announcement and 0 for no macroeconomic 
announcement or AMC announcements. We analyze the potential effect of 
macroeconomic events on both WPCs, price discovery from private information, and 
price efficiency. For brevity, we only present the results for the price discovery with the 
dummy ECON added in Table 10. 
Price discovery = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size + 
β5AHspread + β6AMC + β7NYSE + β8ECON + ε (9) 
The results show that macroeconomic announcement in the morning does not 
materially change our findings. The dummy variable ECON is not statistically different 
from zero. The results on the WPCs and price efficiency are qualitatively similar. 
Therefore, our findings of AHT having significant impact on price discovery and price 






Robustness Test on Concurrent Macroeconomic Announcements 
We perform a robustness test on the determinants of price discovery in the regression 
framework by adding the ECON dummy variables.  
Price discovery = α + β1Analysts + β2Surprise + β3Volume + β4Firm_Size + 
β5AHspread + β6AMC + β7NYSE + β8ECON + ε (9) 
The variables are the same as in regression (7) with an additional dummy variable 
ECON, where ECON equals 1 if GDP, unemployment, CPI or PPI data is released on the 
same day as the earnings releases in the BMO period, and 0 if there is no macroeconomic 
announcement. The t-statistics of the coefficients are reported in italic.  
Independent Variables 1 2 
Intercept -0.1318  -0.0535  
 -1.33  -0.52  Analysts 0.0013  0.0012  
 1.47  1.36  Surprise -0.0965  -0.0772  
 -0.75  -0.60  Volume 0.0412  0.0390  
 4.55
*** 4.31*** 
Firm_Size -0.0215  -0.0231  
 -2.75*** -2.97*** 
AHspread  -0.0114  
  -3.13*** 
AMC 0.0623  0.0669  
 4.35*** 4.66*** 
NYSE -0.0521  -0.0475  
 -4.61*** -4.18*** 
ECON -0.0104  -0.0119  
 -0.25  -0.29  
 





7. Concluding Remarks 
After-hours trading (AHT) has gained interest from traders, researchers, and 
regulators in recent years. Even though trading volume is relatively low compared to the 
regular hours trading (RTH), AHT plays a significant role for the market to act upon 
corporate announcements which are concentrated during the before market open (BMO) 
or after market close (AMC) periods. We use a sample of stocks included in the S&P500 
for the years 2004-2008, in which 95% of earnings announcements released either during 
BMO or AMC. Our study focuses on price reactions, price discovery and efficiency in 
AHT immediately following earnings announcements. Contrary to the thin trading often 
documented for AHT, we find that overall trading activity is heightened greatly on the 
earnings announcements days. Even though illiquidity remains an issue for AHT 
compared to RTH, we find higher level of liquidity on the event days. Investors act 
swiftly following the earnings announcements as we observe immediate price reactions in 
AHT. The trades during BMO and AMC periods contribute to 36% and 60% of price 
changes, respectively. Price discovery are also much higher for AHT following the event 
despite relatively low volume. As a result of AHT trading, the short term price changes 
after the announcements to the market open reflect the earnings news efficiently. 
 Our study clearly demonstrates the importance of AHT on days when corporate 
earnings are released outside of RTH. Given the current level of AHT volume, informed 
traders who have access to AHT are able to trade ahead of the majority of investors. Our 
findings also have implications for studies of PEAD as event studies around earnings 
announcements should not only take account the timing of the AHT announcements 
62 
 






ADAMS, G.; G. MCQUEEN; AND R. WOOD. “The Effects of Inflation News on High 
Frequency Stock Returns.”  Journal of Business 77(2004): 547–574. 
ATIASE, R. K. “Predisclosure Information, Firm Capitalization, and Security Price 
Behavior around Earnings Announcements.” Journal of Accounting Research 23 
(1985): 21–36. 
BAGNOLI, M.; M. CLEMENT; AND S. WATTS. “Around-the-Clock Media Coverage and the 
Timing of Earning Announcements.” Unpublished Paper, McCombs Research 
Paper Series No.ACC-02-06, University of Texas at Austin, 2006. 
BARCLAY, M. J.; AND T. HENDERSHOTT. “Price Discovery and Trading After Hours.” 
Review of Financial Studies 40 (2003): 1041-1073. 
BARCLAY, M. J.; AND T. HENDERSHOTT. “Liquidity Externalities and Adverse Selection: 
Evidence from Trading After Hours.” Journal of Finance 59 (2004):, 681-710. 
BARCLAY, M. J.; AND T. HENDERSHOTT. “A Comparison of Trading and Non-Trading 
Mechanisms for Price Discovery.” Journal of Empirical Finance 15 (2008): 839–
849. 
BARCLAY, M. J.; AND J. B. WARNER. “Stealth Trading and Volatility: Which Trade Move 
Prices?” Journal of Financial Economics 34 (1993): 281–305. 
BERKMAN, H.; AND C. TRUONG. “Event Day 0? After-Hour Earnings Announcements.” 
Journal of Accounting Research 47 (2009): 71–103. 
BIAIS, B.; P. HILLION; AND C. SPATT. “Price Discovery and Learning During the 
Preopening Period in the Paris Bourse.” Journal of Political Economy 107 (1999): 
1218–1248. 
CAO, C.; E. GHYSELS; AND F. HATHEWAY. “Price Discovery with Trading: Evidence from 
the NASDAQ Preopening.” Journal of Finance 55 (2000): 1339-1365. 
CLIFF, M.; M. J. COOPER; AND H. GULEN. “Return Differences Between Trading and Non-
Trading Hours: Like Night and Day.” Unpublished paper, University of Utah, 
2008. 
FOSTER, G.; C. OLSEN; AND T. SHEVLIN. “Earning Releases, Anomalies, and the Behavior 
of Security Returns.” Accounting Review 59 (1984): 574–603. 
64 
 
FRANCIS, J.; D. PAGACH; AND J. STEPHAN. “The Stock Market Response to Earnings 
Announcements Released During Trading Versus Non-Trading Periods.” Journal 
of Accounting Research 30 (1992): 165–184. 
GARFINKEL, J. A.; AND J. SOKOBIN. “Volume, Opinion Divergence, and Returns: A Study 
of Post-Earnings Announcement Drift.” Journal of Accounting Research 44 
(2006): 85–112. 
GLEASON, C. A.; AND C. M. C. LEE. “Analyst Forecast Revisions and Market Price 
Discovery.” The Accounting Review 78 (2003): 193–225. 
GREENE, J. T.; AND S. G. WATTS. “Price Discovery on the NYSE and the NASDAQ: The 
Case of Overnight and Daytime News Releases.” Financial Management 25 
(1996): 19–42. 
HASBROUCK, J. “Measuring the Information Content of Stock Trades.” Journal of 
Finance 46 (1991a): 179–207. 
HASBROUCK, J. “The Summary of Informativeness of Stock Trades: An Econometric 
Analysis.” Review of Financial Studies 4 (1991b): 571–595. 
HENKER, T.; AND J.-X. WANG. “On The Importance of Timing Specifications in Market 
Microstructure Research.” Journal of Financial Markets 9 (2006): 162–179. 
HOLDEN, C. W.; AND A. SUBRAHMANYAM. “Long-Lived Private Information and 
Imperfect Competition.” Journal of Finance 47 (1992): 247–270. 
HUANG, R. D.; AND H. R. STOLL. “Dealer versus Auction Markets: A Paired Comparison 
of Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 41 (1996): 313–357. 
JIANG, C. X.; T. MCINISH; AND J. UPSON. “The Information Content of Trading Halts.” 
Journal of Financial Markets 12 (2009): 703–726. 
LEE, C. M.; AND M. J. READY. “Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data.” Journal of 
Finance 46 (1991): 733–746. 
LEE, C. M.; B. MUCKLOW; AND M. J. READY. “Spreads, Depths, and the Impact of 
Earnings Information: An Intraday Analysis.” Review of Financial Studies 6 
(1993): 345–374. 
LIBBY, T.; R. MATHIEU; AND S. W. ROBB. “Earnings Announcements and Information 




MASULIS, R. W.; AND L. SHIVAKUMAR. “Does Market Structure Affect the Immediacy Of 
Stock Price Responses to News?” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
37 (2002): 617–648. 
MCINISH, T. H.; AND R. A. WOOD. “A Transactions Data Analysis of the Variability of 
Common Stock Returns During 1980–1984.” Journal of Banking and 
Finance14(1990): 99 – 112. 
MCINISH, T. H.; B. F. VAN NESS; AND R. A. VAN NESS. “After-Hours Trading of NYSE 
Stocks on the Regional Stock Exchanges.” Review of Financial Economics 11 
(2002): 287–297. 
MEHTA, N. Direct Edge Expands After-Hours Trading, Traders Magazine, 2009. 
POITRAS, M. “The Impact of Macroeconomic Announcements on Stock Prices: In Search 
of State Dependence.” Southern Economic Journal 70 (2004): 549–565. 
PRONK, M. “The Impact of Intraday Timing of Earnings Announcements on the Bid-Ask 
Spread and Depth.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 21 (2006): 27-54. 
SHORES, D. “The Association Between Interim Information and Security Returns 
Surrounding Earnings Announcements.” Journal of Accounting Research 28 
(1990): 164–181.  
YOHN, T. L. “Information Asymmetry Around Earnings Announcements.” Review of 







THE IMPACT OF LOW COST AIRLINE ENTRY ON COMPETITION,  
NETWORK EXPANSION AND STOCK VALUATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Major economic trends, including globalization and transition to a knowledge-
based economy, have increased international and intra-national travel. As the dominant 
long distance passenger mode in the U.S., airlines have encountered a difficult period 
since 9/11 with decreases in passenger boarding in 2007. Following airline deregulation 
in 1978, the successful emergence of low cost carriers (LCCs) is one of the most 
important structural and financial developments in the airline industry. The concept 
originated in the U.S. and later spread to other parts of the world. What made the market 
highly susceptible to LCC entries were its oligopoly structure, entry barriers and high 
fixed costs.(Moore, Rubin, & Joy [2007]) By 2006, LCCs served one third (32.9%) of all 
domestic origin and destination passengers, and even not using them, about three-fourths 
of domestic passengers had access to LCC service (Daraban [2007]). Southwest Airlines, 
the pioneer of the low cost airline business model was the second largest U.S. carrier in 
terms of both passengers and market share in 2004-2006. 
 
We posit two opposing effects of LCC entry on legacy airline profitability and 
stock prices. The airline industry represents a contestable oligopoly, where the major 
oligopoly participants may refrain from price maximization. Entry of low cost rivals with 
a more efficient cost structure and a different business strategy can significantly alter the 
competitive positioning of the legacy airlines. Thus, the first effect of increased 
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competition points to a negative pressure on legacy airline margins. However, a positive 
network expansion effect of LCC entry is created through economies of scope and 
increased industry-wide connectivity. The spillover effect of expanded network points to 
increased revenues. Thus, the entry of low cost carriers into the airport markets of 
established airlines would be expected to impact the financial performance of the legacy 
airlines. We posit that the trade-off between competitive and spillover effects eventually 
determines the net impact on legacy airline stock prices. The objective of this paper is to 
explore the impact of LCC entry into a large airport on the direction and the magnitude of 
stock price changes of the six legacy airlines. This analysis extends previous research to 
present an event study of the dynamic stock market responses of the legacy, but 
contestable, oligopoly airlines to LCC entry into the hub or major market airports of the 
legacy airlines. The findings will improve understanding of the financial impact of the 
LCCs on stock values in the U.S. airline industry and may also inform policies and 
regulation of the airline industry in the U.S. Although we focus on the airline industry, 
the issues we have analyzed also have bearings in other network industries such as Bank 
branch versus ATMs, real estate MLS, telephone services and internet services, computer 
hardware and software among others. 
 
We organize the rest of the paper into several sections focusing on the airline 
industry structure, literature review, discussion of competition versus network expansion 





II. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
The  1971  entry  of  Southwest  Airlines  into  Love-Field  Airport  of  Dallas  is  
often considered  the  initial  effect  of  deregulation  in  the  passenger  airline  industry.  
Incorporated in 1967, Southwest was facing legal action from the incumbent airlines 
when it announced its intention to start carrying passengers. Finally in late 1970, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld Southwest’s right to fly (Texas State Historical 
Association [2008]). After that, the industry pushed towards deregulation which came in 
1978 with the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act. Market forces led to the entry of 
many new airlines leading to a significant network expansion. Increased passenger traffic 
opened new business opportunities for all players in the industry. However, new entrants 
were confronted with an aggressive pricing strategy by the legacy carriers. Only a few 
start-up airlines were able to survive that era and position themselves in the market. At 
the end of the 20th century, new airlines (e.g. Frontier Airlines in 1994, JetBlue Airways 
in 1999) entered the market and were able to gain market shares due to their different 
business model based on a lower cost structure. Transport Research Board [1999] 
analyzed the routes that Southwest entered between 1990 and 1998 and found that on 
average passenger trips increased 174 percent. Other new carriers emulated the strategy 
that Southwest Airlines, and America West Airlines started in 1983 by offering even 
lower airfares. Although both business and leisure passengers benefited substantially 
from airline deregulation and subsequent reduced fares, the network airlines found 
themselves in a situation of competitive and financial difficulty. Since the late 1990s, the 
legacy carriers have been in a crisis mode, American Airlines being the only carrier of the 




Comparing their business models and the unique structure of the airline industry, 
airlines can be divided into three main categories: legacy, low cost, and regional carriers. 
In the U.S., the term “legacy carriers” refers to the traditional airlines or “The Big Six” 
including: American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, 
United Airlines, and US Airways1
Legacy carriers are characterized by a hub-and-spoke system which has become 
the centrepiece of their business model. Delta Airlines developed the system in 1955 and 
created a hub at Hartsfield-Jackson Airport in Atlanta, GA. After the deregulation of the 
airline industry in 1978, American Airlines was given the lowest chance of survival due 
to its high cost structure (Daraban [2007]). However, the company implemented a new 
strategy which soon became a symbol of the legacy airlines. Starting with a hub in 
Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX, American Airlines concentrated departures and arrivals at certain 
airports in order to increase the probability of connecting outbound flights with inbound 
flights. In contrast to the previous model of point-to-point transit, passengers fly from 
their departure city along a spoke to a hub and board a flight on another, often major or 
longer, spoke to their destination. Airlines generally use large aircraft to serve these 
trunk-lines between hubs, and smaller airplanes for the connections of a hub to another 
.  While most regional airlines, as the name suggests, 
focus on regional markets or serve as a feeder for a legacy carrier, most LCCs, as well as 
all the legacy airlines, serve cities across the United States. This study focuses on the 
impact of LCCs on the legacy airlines, with focus on the stock valuation effect as well as 
competitive and network expansion impacts of LCC entry into large airports served by 
the legacy carriers. 
 
                                                          
1 The merger of Delta and Northwest Airlines in 2008 occurred subsequent to the period of this 
analysis, so that the six legacy carriers analyzed remained through 2007. 
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city along a spoke. The simple model of a hub and spoke network is shown in Figure 1 
Panel A. The effects of competition and network expansion deriving from LCC entry are 
shown in Panel B discussed below. 
Using the hub-and-spoke model, the legacy airlines try to achieve maximum 
connectivity while reducing less profitable routes, leaving the smaller routes to the 
regional carriers and LCCs. The combination of several nodes on one flight route creates 
cost efficiencies, because fewer flights are needed to connect the same number of cities. 
The hub and spoke model has been preferred by the legacy airlines as an airport system 
since it generates higher flight frequency and traffic between hubs and reduces passenger 
inconvenience from extra travel time (Brueckner [2004]). One essential characteristic of 
the hub-and-spoke system is that operating costs are largely fixed and independent of the 
number of passengers transported, so that, if there is a vacant seat, transportation of a 
marginal passenger has close to zero cost. Because of the lower costs and the extensive 
coverage of regional markets, a hub-and-spoke network represents a considerable, but 
penetrable, barrier of entry for new airlines (Rubin and Joy [2005]). Other characteristics 
of the legacy airline business model are the existence of different classes on an airplane, 
frequent flyer programs, airport lounges, and strategic alliances with other airlines, 
including both regional (e.g. SkyTeam, Star Alliance) and legacy (e.g. NWA with KLM 
and Delta and Continental) carriers. 
 
A low cost carrier or low cost airline (also known as a no-frills or discount carrier) 
is an airline that offers generally low fares and eliminates many passenger services 


















    Panel A. Hub-and-spoke model 
 
 
  Legacy airlines route 
LCC competition 
LCC network expansion 
 









The diagram depicts hub-and-spoke model  
The model used by legacy airlines to achieve maximum connectivity between highly 









airlines operating in the U.S. with some of these subsidiaries of the legacy airlines. In this 
paper, we include only the six largest LCCs that operate solely as low cost airlines; these 
six LCCs comprise 21.3% of the total 769.4 million domestic and international 
passengers flying in the U.S. in 2007 (BTS [2008]). Although some LCCs, like Frontier 
Airlines, also operate under a hub-and-spoke model, their business model is distinct from 
that of the established airlines. 
 
LCC’s lower operating cost structure is achieved by three different types of 
savings: distribution, product design, and overhead savings (Magill [2004]). First, 
distribution savings are achieved because flights can only be booked on-line instead of 
through travel agencies. Thus, the LCC airlines operate without computer reservation 
system fees or other travel agency commission fees, and they generally do not have 
frequent flyer programs. Second, product design savings are realized with different 
aircraft design. The LCCs not only operate airplanes with only one class, they also try to 
increase the number of seats in an aircraft by reducing legroom. Airlines that operate with 
a low cost structure are often known as no-frills airlines, referring to the non-availability 
of free food, beverages, and newspapers, as well as reduced flight service. More recently, 
the legacy airlines have also moved in the same direction to reduce costs wherever 
possible. The business model of typical low cost airline is usually based on a single type 
of airplane providing a substantial cost advantage from reduced training and maintenance 
cost, fast turnaround time allowing maximized aircraft utilization, and minimal diversity 
of equipment. Low cost airlines are less likely to be unionized and also practice a strategy 
of aggressive fuel hedging (Daraban [2007]). Finally, some LCCs reduce operational 
overhead by serving secondary urban airports, thereby avoiding high airport charges. All  
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these factors make possible a reduced cost per available seat kilometre ($/ASK) of up to 
50% (Magill [2004]). 
Due to these substantial cost differences, LCCs are able to offer lower air fares 
and to penetrate markets of established airlines, despite the high barriers of entry in the 
airline industry. Entry barriers result not only from the hub-and-spoke system, but also 
from scarce landing slots at airports, as well as federal restrictions against foreign 
ownership of U.S. airlines that preclude the possibility of international investment. But 
the main barrier to entry is the existing oligopoly market structure of the airline industry, 
because a limited number of firms can set or change prices in the industry. Actions taken 
by any firm in an oligopoly are quickly noticed by its competitors and subject to swift 
reactions. This results in interdependence among the oligopoly companies because each 
airline knows that its market power is contestable or vulnerable to entry or other rival 
reactions (Rubin and Joy [2005]). 
Oligopoly market power is usually measured by the industry concentration ratio, 
which relates the market share of the largest firms in the industry to the size of the entire 
market. As depicted in Figure 3, from February 2007 to January 2008, the market share 
of the so-called Big Six was almost 60% of all Revenue Passenger Miles. Southwest 








Figure 2  
Comparison of cost structures between network legacy airlines and low cost carriers 
Source: Magill, D. [2004], “Overview of the Low Cost Carrier Market Worldwide”, 3rd 
Annual MIT Airline Industry – Washington DC Conference  







Market shares of airline industry by revenue passenger miles 
Market shares of the six legacy airlines, Southwest Airline and others from February 
2007 to January 2008.  
Source: Website of Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Research and Innovative 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Substantial research on the entry of  LCCs  deals  with  the  emergence  and  
success  of  Southwest Airlines, the first and most successful low cost airline in the U.S. 
Bogulaski, Ito and Lee  [2004]  try  to  determine  and  quantify  the factors  and  market  
characteristics  that  impact Southwest’s entry decision. They search routes that are most 
likely to be entered and predict the implications  on  the  legacy  airlines, concluding  that  
future  entries  of  Southwest  airlines  are expected to increasingly affect the revenues of 
established carriers. Flouris and Walker [2005] examine the stock and  accounting  
performance  of  three  airlines  (Southwest,  Continental,  and Northwest)  in  the  
aftermath  of  9/11,  finding  dramatic  changes  in  the  airline  industry  and significant 
implications for the economic gains and future of most airlines. Focusing on the stock 
market’s  perception  of  the  viability of low-cost  versus  full-service  business  models  
following 9/11,  they  concluded  that,  in  the  eyes  of  investors,  Southwest’s  business  
model  provides significantly  more  financial  and  operational  flexibility  than  full-
service  airlines.  The  LCC business model has also been introduced in Europe and Latin 
America. Alderighi, Cento, Nijkamp and Pretveld. [2004] investigated  the  response  of  
full  service  carriers  or  legacy  airlines  to  the  entry  of  LCCs  into European  markets.  
They  find  that  when  LCCs  enter  a  market,  the  legacy  airlines  react  by reducing 
their airfares with a larger impact on business class than leisure class fares. Oliveira 
[2008] studied the route choice model of Gol Airline’s entry in Brazil, as the first LCC 
airline in Brazil and Latin America. Gol initially followed a strategy similar to that of 
Southwest Airline by focusing on short-haul and high density routes. It succeeded in 
penetrating the market and now has 13 percent market share and is the only profitable 
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airline in that market. Beyond the impact of competition on pricing, Mazzeo [2003] 
studied the effect of competition on service quality, finding that flight delays are more 
prominent and longer on routes where airlines face less competition. 
Other research addresses the impact of LCC entry on airfares. Several studies 
(Windle and Dresner [1995], Bennet and Craun [1993] and Morrison and Winston 
[1995]) find that LCC entry into the markets of established airlines significantly reduces 
ticket prices. More recently, Ito and Lee [2003] analyze the pricing behaviour of the 
legacy airlines that are impacted by LCC entry. They find that the incumbent response to 
an LCC entry is rarely aggressive, i.e. the incumbents adjust their airfares by lowering 
them but rarely try to undercut the LCC fares in order to squeeze the entrants out of the 
market. Dresner et al. [1996] find that airfares on a competitive route are lowered when 
an LCC enters a certain city pair. This approach takes into account consumers’ 
willingness to drive to a nearby airport (e.g. Oakland, CA vs. San Francisco, CA). Similar 
behaviour is observed by WinburSmith Associates (WSA) [2007] in the Pittsburgh 
region. The study claims “in 2000, more than 193,600 residents of western Pennsylvania 
drove to Cleveland, Columbus and Akron, to take advantage of the competitive pricing 
offered by LCC at nearby airports.” In addition to price adjustments in the case of an 
actual entry on a route, Goolsbee and Syverson [2005] find that incumbents adjust their 
fares even when the route is only threatened by LCC entry. In their study, a route is 
perceived as threatened when Southwest starts operating on both endpoints of the route 
but not the route itself. A recent study by Daraban [2007] on the impact of LCCs on 




actions of travellers who select among alternative routes and, thus, generate a correlation 
of airfares on adjacent routes. 
While the impact of LCCs on airfares and airline markets in general has been 
researched, the competitive effects of LCCs are not limited to their air routes and fares, 
but may also impact the stock valuation of legacy carriers when LCCs enter their hub or 
major markets. For example, Whinston and Collins [1992] conducted an event study 
analysis that is most similar to the approach used in this paper. They cover two years of 
entry announcements into airport-pairs by People Express (an LCC that operated in the 
U.S. from 1981 to 1987) to shed light on airline competitive structure and examine the 
stock price reactions of incumbent airlines to People Express entry announcements into 
various routes. We expand this body of research in several ways. First, we expand their 
two-year coverage of one LCC to look at the entry of six dominant LCCs during 30 years 
into 31 of the largest and hub airports of the six legacy carriers. We broaden the analysis 
of the effect of LCC announcements beyond the individual entry routes to the 
comprehensive strategies of airlines and their impact on overall stock valuations. 
Moreover, we examine the spillover effects of LCC entry in addition to the competitive 
effects. The extended time period, including such events as 9/11 and the shift from 
largely travel agent to on-line marketing and ticketing, etc., could potentially change the 
way LCC entry affects legacy airlines in recent times relative to the period studied by 
Whinston and Collins [1992]. 
 
Whereas focusing on individual LCC routes would be appropriate to understand 
airfare pricing issues, our research design pertains to the understanding of stock values. 
Stock returns are impacted by multiple considerations, and we note that a single LCC 
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entry may impact multiple routes of multiple airlines on the same date. Moreover, the 
individual route decisions are often part of a large strategic corporate decision of airport 
entry keeping in mind potential competition and maximization of overall potential 
consumer base. 
Our paper extends previous work by using both the dates of announcements and 
the actual entry dates into airports to determine whether LCC entry has a significant 
effect on competition and network expansion, as well as stock prices, of the established 
airlines in the 21st century. To analyze the impact of the announcement and actual entry 
of the six largest low cost carriers on the six legacy airlines, we apply both standard event 




















 Panel B. Number of LCC entries by year they began operations: 1970-2007 
 
Figure 4 
Number of announcements of low cost carrier entry by year 
The low cost carriers included in the study are AirTran, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue, 
Southwest, and Spirit. The study includes events from the first Southwest Airline 
announcement in 1970 until 2007. There were no subsequent new entrants into the 
industry until the 1990s and there are some years with no LCC announcements or entries. 
Panel A depicts the number of announcements from 6 LCCs, 1970-2007.  Panel B 
presents the number of LCC entries 1971-2007. 












































































































IV. COMPETITION VS. NETWORK EXPANSION AND   
ECONOMIES OF SCOPE 
We posit that competition and network expansion are two important effects of 
LCC entry. Economides and Salop [1992] provide a theoretical model and discussion of 
the trade-off between competitive and complementary effects in the context of network 
market structure. LCC entry may be a catalyst for price wars among airlines, as the 
incumbent legacy airlines face increased price competition when LCCs enter the airports 
they serve. In contrast, the complementarities emerge from new LCC routes and 
additional LCC passengers who previously did not have flight options from their 
respective cities. 
 
Hurdle et al. [1989] show that the number of potential entrants affects market 
concentration measured by fares. For example, Wilbur Smith Associates (WSA) [2007] 
finds that airfares of US Airways, which dominated the Pittsburgh region, drop 
dramatically with the expansion of AirTran in this airport. Air fares in Pittsburgh 
declined 27% while average airfare in the U.S. increased about 7% (Wilbur Smith 
Associates [2007]). Most studies conclude unanimously that LCC entry adversely affects 
the fares charged by the legacy airlines, and these price-effects point to potentially lower 
profits and stock prices for legacy airlines. In our experimental design, observation of 
negative abnormal stock returns for legacy airlines indicates that the competition effect 
dominates. 
LCC entry has both costs and benefits, as the incumbent airlines may also enjoy 
benefits from increased traffic connectivity when an LCC starts serving new routes. We 
show a simple model of LCC entry and its effects on competition and network expansion 
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in Figure 1 Panel B. LCC entry into a market creates increased competition among 
incumbent airlines if they fly the same routes. When an LCC launches routes that were 
not operated previously by the existing airlines, it creates a network expansion effect in 
the market. WSA [2007] estimates an increase of more than 110,000 passengers visiting a 
region served by an LCC and new demand of more than 76,000 passengers from those 
who otherwise would not have travelled by plane. A similar study by Chmura Economics 
& Analytics [2006] reports the entry of two LCCs, AirTran in June 2005 and JetBlue in 
March 2006, into Richmond International Airport (RIC). The study shows that with these 
LCC entries, for the year 2006, the number of passengers in RIC increased by 400,000 
passengers, a dramatic change from previous years, and average fares were reduced 
across airlines. Whinston and Collins [1992] find that fares of incumbents fell on routes 
both to the same city-pair and to other airports with LCC introduction. 
 
However, the incumbents also benefit from a network expansion effect which 
refers to the benefit that a participant in a network derives from others. The utility that a 
user derives from consuming their products or services increases with the expansion of 
the network. Katz and Shapiro [1992] in their theoretical model of network externalities, 
competition and compatibility point out that “the central feature of the market that 
determines the scope of the relevant network is whether the products of different firms 
may be used together”. Their model suggests that even though competing firms will try to 
differentiate their services and dominate the market, the firms may also have an incentive 
to choose to create compatible product or services. The latter strategy, however, leads to 
an increase in size of the market. As a result, consumers benefit from a larger network. In 
the airline industry, traditional carries can benefit by connecting passengers from un-
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served origins to the served destinations, and vice versa, if the LCC introduces new 
routes that are not served currently by the airline. Since the routes from origin and 
destination cities of LCCs are more limited, and the legacy airlines have more 
comprehensive routes than LCC airlines, the network benefit of LCC entry to the 
traditional airlines can outweigh the competitive losses. Hallowell [2000] proposes that 
economies of scope in passenger airline cargo benefit overall operations, as long as the 
airlines earn marginal revenues higher than marginal costs on cargo, because their 
existing assets (aircraft) are utilized more efficiently. 
A study by the European Parliament [2007) on the growth of low-cost airlines in 
European markets concludes that LCC development benefits the relevant 
macroeconomies. It brings new traffic demand for existing and newly developed airports 
and also creates additional traffic flows on newly created routes that were not previously 
served by legacy airlines. It creates a significant impact on regional economies since 
LCCs tend to choose regional airports to complement their business model. As a result, 
some little known or underdeveloped regions become more visible when promoted by 
LCC advertisement so that both regional and legacy airports mutually benefit from 
enhanced economic development. 
 
In our regression analyses, we focus on the two key variables of competition and 
network expansion and control for several other factors that may affect stock prices. We 
hypothesize that the level of competition should have a negative effect on the returns of 





H1: An increase in airline industry competition due to LCC entry is negatively 
associated with returns of the legacy airlines.  
H2: An increase in airline network expansion due to LCC entry is positively 
associated with returns of the legacy airlines. 
We test these two hypotheses with both announcement and entry dates. The drift 
after announcements and additional effects on implementation are not a completely rare 
phenomenon. The entry announcements do not contain information about airfare pricing, 
plane sizes, and other details which are important determinants of overall profitability. 
We also note that these findings are consistent with the broad conclusion that spillover 
effects (known fully only after implementation) of LCC entry outweigh competitive 
impacts (already known upon announcement). 
V. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
V(i). Data.   
To conduct this study, data was collected and datasets developed for the following: the 
established carriers and the low cost carriers, major and hub airports, LCC announcement 
and entry dates for 1971 through 2007, and the relevant daily stock prices of the legacy 
airlines during this period. Because manual collection of LCC announcement and entry 
dates constituted an extensive and time-consuming process, we limit the number of events by 
focusing on the 30 largest U.S. airports and four additional hub airports of the six major 
carriers. We obtain data from several sources. First, the Bureau of Transportation and 
Statistics, Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) provides a long 
history of very comprehensive data on air traffic since 1990. Table 1 Panel A presents 
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basic data for the six legacy airlines whose stock prices are analyzed, including: 
American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, United 
Airlines, and US Airways. The seventh network carrier, Alaska Airlines, is more limited 
in scope and is not generally considered among the legacy airlines and is not included in 
this study.  
 
TABLE 1 





Enplaned in 2006 
(Thousands)a 
Operating Revenues in 
2006 (Millions)b 
Panel A. Legacy Airlines 
American 
Airlines 1934 98,142 
22,493 
Continental 
Airlines 1934 46,738 
13,010 
Delta Airlines 1929 72,524 17,339 
Northwest 
Airlines 1926 54,837 
12,555 
United Airlines 1926 69,265 19,334 
US Airways 1939 57,659 11,845 
Panel B. Low Cost Carriers 
AirTran Airways 
/ ValuJet Airlines 1993 20,033 
 
1,893 
ATA Airlines 1973 2,624 752 
JetBlue Airways 1999 18,507 2,363 
Frontier Airlines 1994 8,895 1,131 
Southwest 
Airlines 1967c 96,276 
9,086 
Spirit Airlines 1980 4,477 540 
Sources: Websites of Airlines, Air Transport Association, 2006 ATA Annual Report, 
www.airlines.org.  
a  Scheduled Services only,  
b All Services (including charter service). 
c  Southwest was incorporated in 1967, but started flying in 1971. 
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While the established airlines are widely recognized, the selection process for the 
low cost carriers whose entries were to be examined was more complicated, mainly 
because no definitive list of the largest LCCs by an official source was found. Thus, to 
determine the optimum number of LCCs for analysis, the first approach was an Air 
Transport Association [2007] list that includes every airline in the United States, from 
which we eliminated the smaller regional and charter airlines, as well as all cargo 
carriers. The issue of defining a threshold for LCC inclusion remained, as study criteria 
could have been market shares or passengers. We first excluded airlines that had 
previously been large LCCs but have gone out of business. Ultimately, financial data 
reports by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics proved helpful because they list 
financial figures of a 21-carrier group that includes the seven largest network, regional, 
and low cost airlines (U.S. Department of Transportation [2007]). The selected group of 
six LCCs (AirTran Airways, ATA Airlines, Frontier Airlines, JetBlue Airways, 
Southwest Airlines, and Spirit Airlines) described in Table 1 Panel B provides the 
dominant LCCs that fit the research criteria. 
 
Research on the selected LCCs raised further issues related to the carriers. First, 
there was the merger of America West Airlines with US Airways in 2005. America West 
was started in 1983 and became the second largest LCC in the U.S, but its merger with 
US Airways, completed in late 2007, resulted in a change of business strategy for US 
Airways. Although the airline now considers itself a low cost carrier, the recent change in 
its business strategy was completed after the last entry date of this study sample (US 
Airways Annual Report [2006]), and as such, in this research, US Airways is included as 
a legacy network airline. However, due to the merger with US Airways, no data was 
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available on America West’s destinations and announcement or entry dates into new 
airports. Thus, America West Airlines had to be eliminated from this analysis, leaving 
only six LCCs in the sample. 
Additional LCC issues concerned AirTran and ATA airlines. First, AirTran 
Airways, a small airline based in Orlando, FL, was bought by ValuJet in 1997. Following 
a serious ValuJet airplane crash near Miami, FL and consequent FAA investigation, the 
airline’s reputation declined. Due to the crash ValuJet was forced to reduce its operations, 
and it subsequently bought AirTran and adopted the AirTran name (Huettel [2006]). 
Second, in 2004, ATA Airlines filed for bankruptcy and substantially reduced its 
operations, withdrawing from numerous airports and leaving a gap that a code-share 
agreement with Southwest Airlines was supposed to fill. A code-share agreement is an 
accord between two airlines that allows customers of one airline to take connecting 
flights of the other without booking two different flights. Ticketing and airline codes are 
provided by either of the two airlines. After a period of reorganization, ATA again filed 
for bankruptcy on April 2, 2008, discontinuing all operations and cancelling all flights. In 
addition, Spirit Airlines is an LCC that operates from Florida and mainly serves 
Caribbean destinations. 
 
Further data determination concerns the selection of the airports for analysis. The 
sample selected needed to include all the hubs of the established carriers, in addition to 
major non-hub airports out of the total of 566 functioning U.S. airports (FAA [2006]). 
Table 2 shows the 30 largest airports by total number of passengers as of 2006, plus three 
additional hub airports (Cleveland, St. Louis, and Memphis) that are included in order to 
encompass all the hubs of the six legacy carriers. Total passengers are measured as all 
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arriving and departing passengers, with direct transit passengers counted only once. The 
ranking was taken from the Airports Council International – North America, whose 
members account for more than 95% of domestic passenger traffic in North America2
                                                          
2 Toronto-Pearson Airport (YYZ) is one of the largest airports in North America but was not 
included in this study, which focuses only on U.S. airports. 
. 
Honolulu Airport (HNL) and Cincinnati (CVG) entries are excluded from our test 
because exact announcement dates can not be obtained. Toronto-Pearson Airport (YYZ), 
one of the largest airports in North America, is not included in this study, which focuses 
only on U.S. airports. Therefore, our final sample contains announcements and entries of 
LCCs in thirty one airports. 
 Announcement and entry dates for each of the six largest LCCs into these airports 
were individually retrieved from the airlines’ websites, press releases, and the Lexis 
Nexis database for1971 to 2007. There are a total of 110 announcement dates and 109 
entry dates in our sample. In some cases, announcement dates are missing or not 
reported, so we note that not all entries have announcement dates. Also the entry or 
announcement of each of the LCC carriers into any one of the 31 airports is counted as a 
single event. Since our study focuses on understanding stock valuation changes, we avoid 
the econometric problems of clustered route analysis by counting the LCC entry decision 
into an airport as a single strategic decision. Whereas focusing on individual LCC routes 
would be appropriate to understand airfare pricing issues, our research design focuses on 
the understanding of stock values. We believe this is a conservative approach to assess 
the impact of entries on stock returns. The statistical significance of our results would be 




TABLE 2  











2 Chicago O'Hare (ORD)  77,028,134 2 
3 Los Angeles (LAX)  61,041,066 3 
4 Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW)  60,226,138 4 
5 Denver (DEN) 47,325,016 5 
6 Las Vegas (LAS) 46,193,329 7 
7 JFK-New York (JFK) 43,762,282 1 
8 Houston (IAH) 42,550,432 6 
9 Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) 41,436,737 4 
10 Newark (EWR)  36,724,167 3 
11 Detroit (DTW)  35,972,673 4 
12 Minneapolis/St. Paul (MSP)  35,612,133 3 
13 Orlando (MCO) 34,640,451 4 
14 San Francisco (SFO)  33,574,807 6 
15 Miami (MIA)  32,533,974 2 
16 Philadelphia (PHL)  31,768,272 3 
17 Toronto Pearson (YYZ)  30,972,577 - 
18 Seattle-Tacoma (SEA) 29,693,949 5 
19 Charlotte (CLT)  29,693,949 2 
20 Boston Logan (BOS) 27,725,443 5 
21 LaGuardia-New York (LGA) 26,571,146 5 
22 Dulles-Washington DC (IAD)  22,813,067 4 





25 Baltimore/Washington (BWI) 21,184,208 3 
26 Honolulu (HNL) 20,067,871 - 
27 Tampa (TPA) 18,867,541 4 
28 Chicago Midway (MDW) 18,680,663 4 
29 Reagan-Washington (DCA) 18,545,557 5 
30 San Diego (SAN) 17,481,942 5 
 Additional Hub airports:     
  Cincinnati (CVG)  16,244,962 - 
  St. Louis (STL)  15,205,944 5 
  Cleveland (CLE)  11,321,050 1 
  Memphis (MEM) 11,176,460 2 
  Sum: 118 





number of airport entries. We note that stock returns are impacted by multiple 
considerations, and a single LCC entry may impact routes of multiple airlines on the 
same date. 
 
We also find that there are more than 40 distinct announcements and entries for 
the time period between the crisis caused by the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 
and 2007. The major airports are in key U.S. industrial cities, all being served by the 
established carriers. 
Further, due to the scarcity of landing slots or gates at these critical airports, the 
legacy airlines rarely give up slots once they have acquired them, and as a result, the 
presence of the long-term legacy airlines is assumed in the major U.S. airports prior to 
more recent LCC entry. We are able to infer the existence of each airline on all 31 
airports from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database from the BTS 
website3
The stock prices of the legacy airlines were retrieved from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, in order to analyze the impact of LCC 
announcements and entries on the stock prices of the network legacy airlines. While the 
maximum potential sample is 660 announcement dates and 654 entry dates, due to 
mergers and bankruptcies, the stock prices of some airlines are not available during 
. The DB1B data contains all low cost carrier entry and announcement dates 
from 1993 to 2007. This period represents 93% of announcement dates with the 
remaining 7% occurring during 1970 to 1992. We explicitly verified the presence of all 
legacy airlines in all airports analyzed from 1993 onwards. 
 
                                                          
3 The Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) is a 10% sample of airline tickets from 
reporting carriers. Data includes origin, destination and other itinerary details of passengers transported. 
The existence of an airline in a particular airport can be inferred from non-zero and non-missing number of 
passengers in origin/destination airport. 
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certain periods of time. This reduced the sample data to a total of 566 LCC 
announcement dates and 511 LCC entry dates, as shown in Table 3. 
 
 
TABLE 3  
















Dates 107 103 93 86 87 90 566 
Entry Dates 98 93 82 73 77 88 511 
Note: A single LCC entry into one airport can affect numerous legacy airlines. 
 
 
V(ii). Methodology.  
Two separate methodologies are used in this paper: stock price event studies and 
regression analysis. The first approach derives from the seminal event study methods of 
Brown and Warner [1980], which tests security price performance surrounding an event 
date by calculating a cumulative abnormal return (CAR), defined as the summation of 
three-day abnormal returns (AR) enveloping the event day: namely the day before the 
event day, the event day, and the day following the event day. The calculation is based on 
a market model in which the AR of any security is calculated as the actual return in 
period t in excess of the market return in the same period. The market portfolio consists 
of a linear combination of the securities in the S&P 500 Index obtained from Yahoo 
Finance. Thus, the expected returns for any security should equal expected market 
returns. An abnormal or excess return of a security i in period t (ARi,t) is the difference 
between the return of security i in period t (Ri,t) and the expected market return expressed 
as the daily S&P 500 return in period t (Rm,t): 
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  ARi,t  = Ri,t – Rm,t (1)  
           3 
  CARi   =  ∑ ARi,t  (2) 
           t=1 
 
Then we cumulate the abnormal returns (CAR) for three days, (t-1, t, and t+1), 
relative to the event date, in recognition that investors could obtain information from 
rumors about an entry as well as news leaks about the company on the day before the 
actual announcement, or they could obtain their information from newspaper reports of 
entries the day after the actual occurrence. 
To examine a broader view of LCC entry into the industry, we look at quarterly 
data for stock returns and examine the effects of competition and network expansion. We 
hypothesize that LCC entry not only increases competition in the industry but also 
expands the number of airline travelers. Because positive returns of the legacy airlines 
result from investor expectations about competition and revenue expansion, we estimate a 
system of simultaneous equations using two-stage least squares (2SLS) to test our 
hypotheses. 
First, we posit that when LCCs enter the market, the level of competition in the 
industry will increase and the concentration level as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) will decrease. We compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) based on RPM, and use it to assess the level of market concentration. HHI is 
calculated by giving more weight to firms with larger market shares. 
  n 
 HHI =  ∑marketshare2 where n = number of firms in the industry.              (3) 




If the market share is represented as a percentage, the maximum value of HHI is 
1.00, which occurs when one firm dominates the market (monopoly). Therefore, the 
lower the HHI value, the more competition exists in the market, and the higher the HHI 
the lower the competition. In our study, the HHI is an inverse proxy for competition, and 
we expect the legacy airlines to experience higher profit and stock returns if they face 
less competition. 
Second, network externalities are created by an expansion of the base number of 
travelers. We use revenue passenger miles4
                                                          
4 A Revenue Passenger Mile (RPM) is defined as one passenger transported one mile in revenue 
service. Revenue passenger miles are computed by summation of the products of the revenue aircraft miles 
on each inter-airport segment multiplied by the number of passengers carried on that segment. 
http://www.transtats.bts.gov 
 (RPMs) as a proxy for network expansion or 
economies of scope. Unlike either the number of passengers or total airline revenues 
alone, which are also available on RITA website, RPM provides a better measure because 
it takes into account both revenues and number of passengers of the airlines. 
An increased number of LCCs in the network will encourage travelers to fly more 
at the affordable prices. LCCs bring more passengers from different routes and smaller 
cities where no major carrier service connects to the hub-and-spoke system of the major 
carriers. We expect that RPMs of legacy airlines will also be positively related to LCC 
entry. 
Because our hypothesis is multifaceted, we use the system of equations of two 
stage least squares in which quarterly returns of the legacy airlines, changes in the level 





HHIRPM =  β0 + β1LCC + β2PaxIndustry + η1 (4) 
RPM =  γ0 + γ1LCC + γ2GDPService + ν1 (5) 
Ri,q =  α0 + α1HHIRPM + α2RPM + α3(Rm-Rf) + α4SMB +  (6) 
  α5HML + ε1 
 
Equation (4) measures the change in the level of competition using quarterly 
RPMs of the entire industry, where LCC is the number of entries of low cost carriers 
during the quarter. The announcements of LCC entries are not included because 
announcements do not affect either the number of passengers or revenues of the legacy 
airlines. We count the number of LCC entries reported in the Lexis-Nexis database and 
news releases in the LCC websites. We also include the change in the total number of 
passengers in the industry as a control variable. The coefficient β1 is expected to be 
negative, which indicates the inverse relationship between an LCC entry and the level of 
concentration, providing a reverse measure of competition. 
Equation (5) measures the change in RPMs of each legacy airline. The number of 
LCC entries is an exogenous variable; and the growth in GDP in service industries is also 
included as a control variable. The coefficient is expected to be positive, which indicates 
a positive relationship between LCC entry and network expansion. 
In equation (6) we use the predicted value of the change in concentration and the 
change in network expansion as independent variables to predict the endogenous variable 
returns of the legacy airlines. We also include the Fama-French three factor benchmarks 
as control variables. Fama and French [1993] present a model in which stock returns can 
be explained by three factors: 1) the excess return on the market (Rm-Rf); 2) the size 
premium, which is the average return on three small portfolios minus the average return 
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on three big portfolios (SMB); and 3) the book to market ratio premium, which is the 
average return on two value portfolios minus the average return on two growth portfolios 
(HML). 
We also test for the existence of multi-collinearity in the model to statistically 
ensure the validity of our assumption that the variables used in the models are capturing 
different aspects of the industrial economics. For example, in equation (4), the Herfindahl 
index (HHIRPM) and RPMs are measured at airline level whereas the total of passengers 
(PAXIndustry) is aggregated at the industry level. Thus the competitive effects should 
show up in the RPMs but will have no effect on aggregated PAX. On the other hand, 
spillover effects will affect aggregate PAX. We employ a classical econometric test for 
diagnosing collinearity problems – the variance inflation factor (VIF) which is the 
reciprocal of tolerance (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch [1980]). The high values of VIF 
indicate a possibility of multi-collinearity. A value of 10 or higher for VIF (or 0.1 for 





For an LCC serving a new airport, Table 4 shows the three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) enveloping the announcement dates and shown separately for 
entry dates. We find that all cumulative abnormal returns are positive on both 
announcement and entry CARs and are significant and different from zero at a 0.05 level. 
The announcement CAR of the overall sample ranging from 1970 to 2007 is 0.623% and 
on the entry CAR is 0.825%. For the period from 1993 to 2007 during which we are able 
to verify the existence of all six legacy airlines at all thirty one airports, we also observe 
positive CARs of 0.34% and 0.89% on announcement and entry dates, respectively. The 
results are surprising in the context of previous academic research since the market seems 
to respond positively to LCC entrance. Thus, we conduct additional robustness analysis. 
To compare the CARs between event and non-event months, we identify non-event 
months as those months in which there is no LCC entry or announcement and compute 
the CARs for each day in those months. We then compute rollover 3-day cumulative 
abnormal returns for non-event months and average across the entire period. Results are 
shown in Table 4, panel B. The non-event CAR of the entire period is 0.058% and of the 
1993-2007 sub-period is -0.152%. We show in panel C that using either a pooled test or 
Satterthwaite test5
                                                          
5 The pooled test assumes that the two populations have equal variances and it uses degrees of 
freedom n1+n2-2, where n1 and n2 are the sample sizes for the two populations. The Satterthwaite tests do 
not assume that the populations have equal variances and it uses the Satterthwaite approximation for 
degrees of freedom. 
, differences of CARs between announcement dates and non-event 
dates, and entry dates and non-event dates are positive and statistically significant, 




TABLE 4  
ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS SURROUNDING DATES 
OF LOW COST CARRIER (LCC) ANNOUNCEMENT AND ACTUAL ENTRY 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of major airline stocks are computed for the three-
day period enveloping the announcement dates and separately for actual entry dates of 
LCCs. The calculations are based on a market model, in which abnormal return (AR) of 
any securities is calculated as ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t , where ARi,t  is the abnormal or excess 
return of security i on day t.  Ri,t is the return of a security i and day t. Rm,t is the daily 
S&P500 return on day t obtained from Yahoo Finance. The ARs on the day preceding the 
event, event day, and the day following the event are then cumulated to obtain CAR(-
1,0,+1) in Panel A. The analysis is conducted using the full sample period from 1970 to 
2007 as well for a reduced sample periods from 1993 to 2007 when the presence of all six 
legacy airlines on each of the 31 biggest airports can be verified using the DB1B dataset.  
In Panel B, we present the average three-day CAR for non-event periods by excluding the 
months in which an announcement or an entry occurs. The differences between event and 
non-event returns are presented in Panel C. The pooled test assumes that the two 
populations have equal variances and uses degrees of freedom n1+n2-2, where n1 and n2 
are the sample sizes for the two populations. The Satterthwaite tests do not assume that 
the populations have equal variances and uses the Satterthwaite approximation for 
degrees of freedom.  
 
Panel A. Market Model for the sample from 1970 to 2007 and subsample from 1993 to 
2007 
  1970 - 2007 1993 - 2007 
 
 





** 0.340% 1.092 
Entry Dates 0.825% 2.521** 0.892% 2.530** 
 
Panel B. Average three day CARs  in the Non-Event Months with no announcement or 
entry. 
 
















TABLE 4  
ABNORMAL RETURNS AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS SURROUNDING DATES 
OF LOW COST CARRIER (LCC) ANNOUNCEMENT AND ACTUAL ENTRY (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel C. Difference between Event Returns in Panel A and Non-Event returns in Panel B. 























Satterthwaite 2.33** Satterthwaite 2.87*** 





We perform additional sub-sample analysis to ensure that it is in line with 
Whinston and Collin [1992] who find negative returns from the entry of People Express 
during 1984–1985. Looking at the same period for the airlines that we analyze, we also 
obtain negative average returns of -0.06% (t-stat -0.23) during 1984–1985 in response to 
People Express entry. During the same period our sample has another entry by Southwest 
Airlines with an announcement date on February 11, 1985 and entry date on March 17, 
1985. The abnormal returns on these dates were also negative at -1.26% (t-stat -3.17) and 
-1.28 (t-stat -3.03). However, these negative returns seem to pertain only to these very 
early periods. Our overall sample, as well as the more recent periods within the sample, is 
associated with positive announcement returns of 0.62% (t-stat 2.13) and positive entry 
date CARs of 0.83% (t-stat 2.52) as shown in Table 4. Thus, the positive spillover effects 
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seem to dominate the negative competitive effects in the more recent periods.Overall, our 
analysis produces some unexpected results relative to conventional wisdom on the issue 
of LCC entry. The entry or announcement of an LCC entry into a new airport was 
considered to be an event that would negatively affect the stock returns of the established 
airlines at that airport, because market entry of new competitors was assumed to 
potentially reduce the market shares of the legacy airlines. However, only the 
announcement and entry into hubs of the network carriers represent events that negatively 
affect the stock as anticipated, although these results are not statistically significant. This 
result at first appears counter-intuitive. As reported and depicted in Figure 5, most of the 
major airlines have positive CAR during the three-day event window with an almost 1% 
return, except United Airlines which shows negative returns. For the entry event, all 








Panel A. Announcement Days. 
 
Panel B. Entry Days. 
Figure 5 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Legacy Airlines on Low Cost Airlines. 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of six major airline stocks around 
announcement dates and entry dates of LCCs from the market model are illustrated. The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is reported for the day before the event (t=-1) to the 





































Table 5 presents the 2SLS estimate of the system of equations. Panel A presents 
the estimates for the impact of LCC entries on airline industry competition in equation 
(4). The coefficient of LCC is negatively correlated with airline industry Herfindahl 
index. The coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.05 significance level. Thus, LCC 
entry has the hypothesized impact of increasing competition which points to reduced 
pricing power and profitability of the legacy airlines. The coefficient on change in 
number of passenger travelling by planes, which is our control variable, is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level. This implies that the greater the number of passengers 
travelling, the higher the level of competition in the industry. This makes sense because 
entry to new routes by both legacy airlines and low cost carriers becomes more attractive 
when there is a potentially larger demand. 
 
To assess the multicollinearity issues, the tolerance and VIF are reported in 
columns 5 and 6. We find that all the VIFs in our models are less than 1.43 (ranging from 
1.02 to 1.43), which is well within the values of 10 or higher for VIF, an often used as the 
threshold to consider multi-collinearity to be a problem (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 
[1980]). Therefore, we can be confident that the variables in our models do not suffer 







TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS 
The first stage regressions are estimates of the effects of LCC entry on competition and 
network expansion. The predicted value of changes in competition and network 
expansion are then used in the second stage to estimate the effect on the legacy airline 
stock returns.  
 
HHIRPM =  β0 + β1LCC + β2PaxIndustry + η1 (4) 
RPM =  γ0 + γ1LCC + γ2GDPService + ν1 (5) 
Ri,q =  α0 + α1HHIRPM + α2RPM + α3(Rm-Rf) + α4SMB +  (6) 
  α5HML + ε1 
 
Ri,q  is the return of legacy airline i in quarter q. Other than for stock returns, the 
subscripts i and q are not shown for simplicity. ΔHHIRPM is the percentage change in 
level of concentration as measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, using revenue 
passenger miles (RPM) from every passenger airline in the industry in quarter q. ΔRPM 
is the percentage change in RPM of the legacy airline i in quarter q. LCC is number of 
low cost airline entries in quarter q. Rm-Rf, SMB, and HML are the 3 benchmarks from 
the Fama and French [1993] three factor model. ΔPaxIndustry is the entire industry 
percentage change in number of passengers travelling by plane.  ΔGDPService is the 
percentage change of quarterly GDP in the service industry. The error terms are  ε1,η1, 
and ν1.  
 
Panel A: LCC Entry Impact on Airline Industry Competition  
Eq.(4) :  ΔHHIRPM = β0 + β1 LCC + β2 ΔPaxIndustry +  η2 
Variables Estimates Standard Errors tValue 
Tolerance Variance 
Inflation 
Intercept 0.04444 0.15974 0.28 - - 
LCC -0.17537 0.08803 -1.99** 0.95084 1.05170 
ΔPaxIndustry 5.35561 1.55276 3.45*** 0.95084 1.05170 







TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS. (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel B: Network Expansion Benefits of LCC Entry    
Eq.(5) :  ΔRPM = γ0 + γ1 LCC + γ2 ΔGDPService + ν1   
Variables Estimates Standard Errors tValue 
Tolerance Variance 
Inflation 
Intercept -5.22843 2.52759 -2.07* - - 
LCC 0.76278 0.37589 2.01* 0.97594 1.02466 
ΔGDPService 3.69670 1.55527 2.38* 0.97594 1.02466 
 
 
Panel C: Stock returns response to competition and network expansion generated by LCC 
entry. 
 
Eq.(6) :  Ri,q  = α0 + α1ΔHHIRPM + α2ΔRPM + α3(Rm-Rf) + α4SMB + α5HML+ ε1 
Variables Estimates Standard Errors tValue 
Tolerance Variance 
Inflation 
Intercept -0.09771 0.02025 -4.82*** - - 
ΔHHIRPM -0.07581 0.0355 -2.13** 0.97372 1.02699 
ΔRPM 0.02849 0.01019 2.80*** 0.96752 1.03358 
Rm-Rf 0.02368 0.00215 11.04** 0.69912 1.43038 
SMB -0.000789 0.003283 -0.28 0.78724 1.27025 
HML 0.01292 0.00205 6.31*** 0.86541 1.15552 




Panel B presents the estimates from the equation (5) for spillover benefits of 
network expansion. The coefficient of LCC entry is positive and significant at the 0.05 
level. This implies that an increase in number of low cost carriers increases overall 
business activity in the airline sector, with some portion of this increase accruing to the 
legacy airlines. Our control variable in this regression is economic growth, particularly in 
the service industry (measured by GDP Services), because demand for airline travel is 
103 
 
expected to increase in a growing economy. The coefficient is positive and significant as 
hypothesized. 
Panel C presents the second stage regression results for airline stock returns using 
the predicted values for competition and network expansion from the first stage 
regressions, which become our key explanatory variables. The coefficient on the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is an inverse measure of competition, is 
negative 7% while that of network expansion is positive 3%. These results are in line 
with the intuition that the entry of an LCC generates a trade-off between increased 
competitions versus increased opportunities resulting from network expansion. The 
coefficient for the control variable, quarterly market return shows a significant and 
positive relation with airline returns. The results of regression support our hypotheses that 
after controlling for overall market return, the stock return of legacy airlines are impacted 
negatively from higher competition and positively from network expansion. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined the impact on the stock prices of major legacy airlines of 
LCC entry announcements and actual entries into the airport markets of established 
carriers. As a surprising result, significant positive abnormal returns are observed. These 
effects of LCC entry may be explained either by the more critical importance of other 
variables or, more likely, by the economic factor of positive network externalities, in the 
form of spillovers or economies of scope, that increase the revenues of legacy airlines. 
We examine the broader view from quarterly data with two stage least squares regression 
models. We posit that there are two possible explanations for the effects of LCC entry 
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and that these have contrasting impacts: the first is competition and the second is network 
expansion. 
First, the legacy airlines face a higher level of competition when LCCs enter their 
markets with new routes. Since the deregulation of the airline industry three decades ago, 
numerous upstart airlines have tried to copy the business model of Southwest Airlines. 
Most investors are likely to consider an LCC entry as a catalyst of increased competition 
in the industry. In contrast, the network expansion effect from LCC entry into the market 
of an established airline may enhance the position of the legacy carrier by producing 
positive economic externalities or spillovers instead of a loss of market share. These 
externalities are achieved through economies of scope by the aggregation and 
enhancement of transportation opportunities within the airport area. If a new LCC enters 
an airport, it may increase the air traffic and connections between open routes of major 
airlines and increase the number of passengers into the airport from sources where no 
connection previously existed. Or the LCC entry may connect more people to that airport, 
even if an established carrier previously served the same city-pair. Because an LCC 
reduces the airfares on that route, more people can afford to fly the route, and the demand 
for tickets on the connecting network airline is increased. Usually, the established carrier 
has been in the airport for a longer time and serves more and further destinations. More 
passengers flying into the airport on the new LCC route result in increased demand for 
connecting flights of the established carriers. Thus, an LCC entry may increase revenues 
and enplanements of the network carriers by providing more connecting customers and 
fulfil an objective of the hub-and-spoke system. As a result, stock prices of the legacy 
airlines would increase rather than decrease. Thus, investors could consider the LCC 
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entry to be a marginal event in terms of anticipated effects on the revenue of legacy 
airlines and more significant in terms of providing a competitive catalyst. Alternately, the 
entry of an LCC could be an event with low impact that is blurred by more significant 
events. The airline industry is dependent on many factors, such as oil prices and the 
macroeconomic situation, and these often produce an unstable oligopoly environment. In 
this scenario, mergers and acquisitions, as well as bankruptcies, may be more likely to 
impact stock prices than the entry of competing LCCs (Rubin and Joy [2005]). 
In the short run the unexpected results we find for three day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) could be due to several limitations of this study that may be explored in 
future research. First, LCC entries into hubs are more meaningful to the legacy airlines 
than LCC entries into other major airports, because the largest components of the 
network carrier operations are located in their hub airports. Based on the limited number 
of hub airports, the sample of entries into hubs does not include enough events to produce 
meaningful results. In future research, sample size might be expanded by increasing the 
number of LCCs. Alternately, the number of airports could be increased instead of using 
only entries into the largest and hub airports. Additionally, the first LCC entry into a 
particular airport could be more significant than subsequent entries because, in that initial 
case, investors do not know how much an LCC entry affects the revenues of legacy 
airlines. This alternative approach would probably place more focus on Southwest 
Airlines, which was the first LCC into most airports. Further, this alternative would 
severely limit the number of entry and announcement dates for analysis and, based on our 
results for hubs only, would probably yield insignificant results. Future research could 
use a different definition of a market of the legacy airlines. While this study defines a 
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market as an airport location, an alternative approach could define a market as a route 
between two cities. If an LCC added a new city-pair, possibly one of the most profitable 
routes for an established carrier, the network airline might incur larger impacts if it is 
forced to lower its airfares, thereby reducing profit. 
Despite these considerations, the airline industry is a critical transportation 
medium in an increasingly global world, particularly for business, and provides a 
dynamic field of study with many approaches for research. Due to its oligopoly structure, 
unique economic and financial analyses can be studied. Further, besides insurance 
companies, airlines were undoubtedly the companies that were most affected by the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath, airlines went bankrupt or were 
forced into mergers; the most recent examples are the bankruptcy of ATA Airlines, the 







Airports Council International – North America, 2007, ‘2006 Airport Traffic Report,’ 
http://www.aci-na.org/stats/stats_traffic, Retrieved Febrary 25, 2008. 
Air Transport Association, ‘2006 ATA Annual Report,’ Retrieved Jan 22, 2008, on 
http://www.airlines.org.  
Alderighi, M., Cento, A., Nijkamp, P., and Rietveld, P., 2004, ‘The Entry of Low-Cost 
Airlines,’ Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI2004-074/3, Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands. 
Bailey, J., 2006, ‘Anger Management at American Airlines,’ International Herald Tribune, 
Retrieved April 16, 2008, on http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/24/business 
/american.php. 
Belsley, D.; Kuh A. E. and Welsch R. E., 1980, ‘Regression Diagnostics: Identifying 
Influential Data and Source of Collinearity,’ (John Wiley & Sons. USA) 
Bennet, R. D. and Craun, J., 1993, ‘The Southwest Effect,’ Office of Aviation Analysis, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. 
Bogulaski, C.; Ito, H. and Lee, D., 2004, ‘Entry Patterns in the Southwest Airlines Route 
System,’ Review of Industrial Organization, 25, pp. 317-350. 
Brown, S. J. and Warner, J. B., 1980. ‘Measuring Security Price Performance,’ Journal of 
Financial Economics, 8, pp. 205-258. 
Brown, S. J. and Warner, J. B., 1985, ‘Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event 
Studies,’ Journal of Financial Economics, 14, pp. 3-31. 
Brueckner, J.K., 2004, ‘Network Structure and Airline Scheduling,’ The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 52, pp. 291-312 
Brueckner, J.K. and Spliller, P.T., 1991, ‘Competition and Mergers in Airline Networks,’ 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, pp. 323-342. 
Chmura Economics & Analytics 2006, ‘Economic Benefit of the Entry of Low Cost 
Carriers to the Richmond Region: An Update of 2005 Study,’ Richmond 
International Airport, Virginia, USA. pp.1-20. 
Daraban, I.B., 2007, ‘Low Cost Carrier Entry, Incumbent Responses and Spatial 





Dresner, M.; Lin, J. S. and Windle, R., 1996, ‘The Impact of Low Cost Carriers on 
Airport and Route Competition,’ Journal of Transportation Economics and 
Policy, 30, pp. 309-328. 
Economides, N. and Salop, S. C., 1992, ‘Competition and Integration among 
Complements, and Network Market Structure,’ The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 40, pp. 105-123. 
European Parliament 2007, ‘The Consequences of the Growing European Low-Cost 
Airline Sector,’ Policy Department: Structural and Cohesion Policies, Transport 
and Tourism. 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R., 1993, ‘Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks 
and Bonds,’ Journal of Financial Economics, 33, pp. 3-56. 
Flouris, T. and Walker, T., 2005, ‘Confidence in Airline Performance in Difficult Market 
Conditions: An Analysis of JetBlue’s Financial Market Results,’ Journal of Air 
Transportation, 10, pp. 38-57. 
Flouris, T. and Walker, T., 2005, ‘The Financial Performance of Low-Cost and Full-
Service Airlines in Times of Crisis,’ Canadian Journal of Administrative 
Sciences, 22, pp. 3-20. 
French, K. R., 2008, ‘Data Library - Current Benchmark Returns’, on 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french /data_library.html. 
Goolsbee, A. and Syverson, C., 2005, ‘How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of 
Entry? Evidence from Major Airlines,’ NBER Working Paper No. 11072. 
Hallowell, R., 2000, ‘Exploratory research: consolidations and economies of scope,’ 
International Journal of Service Industry Management 2, pp. 109-118 
Hernandez, M. R., and Salgado, H., 2006, ‘Economies of Scale and Spatial Scope in the 
European Airline Industry,’ European Regional Science Association, ERSA 
conference papers, No. ERSA06P905. 
Huettel, S., 2006, ‘10 Years After Tragedy, AirTran Flies On,’ St. Petersburg Times.     
on http://www.sptimes.com/2006/05/10/Business /10_zears_after_traged.shtml. 
Hurdle, G. J.; Johnson, R L.; Joskow, A. S.; Werden, G. J. and Williams M. A., 1989, 
‘Concentration, Potential Entry, and Performance in the Airline Industry,’ The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 38, pp. 119-139. 
Ito, H. and Lee, D., 2003, ‘Incumbent Responses to Lower Cost Entry: Evidence from the 
U.S. Airline Industry,’ Working Paper, Brown University, Department of 




Katz, M. and Shapiro, C., 1985, ‘Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility,’ 
American Economic Review 75, pp. 424 – 440. 
Magill, D., 2004, ‘Overview of the Low- Cost Carrier Market Worldwide,’ 3rd Annual 
MIT Airline Industry, Washington D.C. Conference: Winds of Change: The 
Airline Industry in 2004. Washington D.C., USA. 
Mazzeo, M. J., 2003, ‘Competition and Service Quality in the U.S. Airline Industry,’ 
Review of Industrial Organization, 22, pp. 275-296. 
McGowan, F. and Seabright, P., 1989, ‘Deregulation European Airlines,’ Economic 
Policy, 4, pp. 283-344 
Moore, L.; Rubin, R. M. and Joy, J. N., 2007, ‘The World Trade Center Disaster: How 
Terrorist Airline Attacks Can Affect the Legal Economic, and Financial 
Conditions of Airlines under the Montreal Liability Agreement,’ BYU 
International Law & Management Review, 4, pp. 1-20. 
Morrison, S. A. and Winston, C., 1995, The Evolution of the Airline Industry (The 
Brookings Institution Press, New York, USA.). 
Oliveira, V. M. A., 2008, ‘An Empirical Model of Low-Cost Carrier Entry,’ 
Transportation Research Part A, 42, pp. 673-695. 
Rodrigue, J. P.; Comtois, C. and Slack, B., 2006, The Geography of Transport Systems 
(Routledge, New York, U.S.A.). 
Rubin, R. M. and Joy, J. N., 2005, ‘Where Are the Airlines Headed? Implications of 
Airline Industry Structure and Change for Consumers,’ Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, 39, pp. 215-228. 
Sandler, R. D., 1988, ‘Market Share Instability in Commercial Airline Markets and the 
Impact of Deregulation,’ The Journal of Industrial Economics, 36, pp. 327-335  
Transportation Research Board 1999, ‘Entry and Competition in the U.S. Airline 
Industry: Issues and Opportunities,’ National Research Council Special Report 
255, Washington D.C., U.S.A. 
Whinston, M. D. and Collins, S. C., 1992, ‘Entry and Competitive Structure in 
Deregulated Airline Markets: An Event Study Analysis of People Express,’ The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 23, pp. 445-462. 
Windle, R. J. and Dresner, M. E., 1995, ‘The Short and Long Run Effects of Entry on US 

























My dissertation consists of two essays concerning corporate announcements and 
their effects on market responses. The first essay investigates the information contents 
from corporate earnings announcements in the after-hours sessions. The second essay 
examines the effects of low cost airline announcements and entries on the legacy airlines 
on the basis of competition and network expansion. 
 In essay 1, we find that investors react immediately upon corporate earnings 
announcements within the after-hours sessions. Even though after-hours trading volume 
is relatively low compared to the regular trading hours, we find that trading activities are 
greatly heightened up on the earnings announcement days when compared to the non-
announcement days. We provide the empirical evidence suggesting that after-hours 
trading play a significant role in allowing investors to react quickly to breaking news 
stories or the most up-to-date information. We find that the investors act quickly 
following the earnings announcements when we observe immediate price reaction during 
the after-hours periods. The trades during the BMO and AMC periods contribute 36% 
and 60% of price changes, respectively. Price discovery are also much higher for the 
AHT following the event despite relatively low volume. We also find that prices in AHT 
show a large degree of information efficiency, which demonstrates that prices are not 
likely to be completely driven by noise trading. 
 Essay 2 presents the impacts from the entry announcement by low cost carriers 
(LCCs) on the legacy airlines. As opposed to previous findings, we find significant 
positive abnormal returns of legacy airline stocks on the announcements and entry dates 
of LCCs. One explanation is that when LCCs enter their market with new routes, the 
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legacy airlines face a higher level of competition while they also benefit from network 
expansion of LCCs’ new routes. LCCs may help increase the air traffic and connections 
between open routes of major airlines and increase the number of passengers for the 
airport from sources that were not previously served. As a result, stock prices of the 
legacy airlines would increase rather than decrease. We then examine the broader view 
from quarterly data with two stage square regression models. The regression results show 
that the entry of LCCs creates the higher level of competition in the industry and 
increases the overall business activity of the legacy airlines. The regression results on the 
stock return of legacy airlines after controlling for overall market condition also supports 
our hypotheses. The stock returns of legacy airlines are affected negatively by higher 
competition and positively by network expansion. 
